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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
November 9, 1984 Conference
List 1, Sheet 4
No. 84-468
(V.CITY OF CLEBURNE, TEX., et al.

Cert to CAS (Clark,
Goldberg, Politz)

v.
CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER, et al.
(group housing sponsor)
1.

SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

Petrs argue that mentally retarded persons

are not a "quasi-suspect" class for equal protection purposes
and that legislation affecting such persons should not be

~·
~

subjected to an "intermediate" or "heightened" level of
scrutiny.
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2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

'
Resp
Cleburne Living

Centers, Inc. ("CLC") operates supervised group homes for the
mentally retarded.

The center plans to establish such a home

in Cleburne for 13 men and women who are mildly or moderately
retarded.

They would receive 24-hour supervision from CLC

staff members, working in 8-hour shifts.

The residents would

have jobs in the community and in a work activity center.

The

DC found such homes to be "the principal living alternatives
for persons who are mentally retarded."
The applicable zoning ordinance for the proposed location
permits in part:
"2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings.
3. Boarding and lodging houses.
4. Fraternity or sorority houses and
dormitories.
5. Apartment hotels.
6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes or
homes for convalescents or aged, other than
for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics
or drug addicts [emphasis added]."
Apparently a group house for mentally retarded persons falls
within the l ho ~ tal-for-the-feeble-minded category.

Another

section of the zoning ordinance requires that a special use
permit be obtained from the City Council for such hospitals
---../

located within Cleburne.

The permit must be renewed annually.

Resps applied for a special use permit, which was denied
by the City Council after a public hearing based on the
following factors:
"1. the attitude of a majority of owners of
peroperty located within two hundred (200)
feet of [the proposed location];
2. the location of a junior high school
across the street ••. ;

- 3 -

3. concern for the fears of elderly residents
of the neighborhood;
4. the size of the home and the number of
people to be housed;
5. concern over the legal responsibility of
CLC for any actions which the mentally
retarded residents might take;
6. the home's location on a five hundred
(500) year flood plain; and
7. in general, the presentation made before
the City Council."
After exhausting administrative remedies, resps sued for an
injunction

The ~S

in~D.T:x.,
reversed.

which denied relief.
It considered the classification of

mentally retarded persons for equal protection purposes to be
--...

~~

a question of first impression.

It held that "although mental

retardates are not a suspect class, they do share enough of
the characteristics of a suspect class to warrant heightened
..______

---

scrutiny."
.......__

It reasoned that they historically have been

subject to discrimination based on deep-seated prejudice,
"have been segregated in remote, stigmatizing institution

"

this segregation has perpetuated public ignorance and
pejudice, they lack political power to protect their
interests, and their condition is immutable.
Having settled on a heightened standard of review, the
CAS then held the special permit requirement of the zoning
ordinance unconstitutional on its face.

It determined that

the means employed by· the zoning ordinance did not
substantially further any important governmental interest.

It

of the statute to be legitimate,
e.g., avbiding undue concentrations of population and ensuring
safety from fire and other dangers, but held that singling out

- 4 -

group homes for mentally retarded persons, while allowing
home

for the elderly and other group living situations, was

not well tailored to these objectives.

Alternatively, the CAS

held the special permit requirement unconstitutional as
applied.

It determined that the reasons given for the

~-~

~

Council's denial of the permit did not substantially further
any important governmental interest justifying the
discriminatory classification.
The CAS denied rehearing en bane 9-6.

The dissenting

statement a;.gued that unlike the mentally retarded the quasisuspect classications previously recognized--women and
illegitimates--"are not generally different from the rest of
society in terms of their needs and abilities to function."
Finally, the CAS recalled and stayed its mandate pending cert.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs first argue that the CAS's

decision in this case conflicts with the CA9's decision in
California Association of the Physically Handicappped, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Commission, 721 F.2d 667 (1983), an
earlier CAS decision in Brown v. Sibley, 6SO F.2d 760 (1981),
and the principles established in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 686 (1973)

(BRENNAN, J.)

(distinguishing "sex from

such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical
disability" on the ground that "the sex characteristic
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society.").
Petrs next argue that conferring quasi-suspect status on
mentally retarded persons will interfere with legitimate state

- s and federal legislation designed to help ' them.

Moreover, the

treatment of the mentally retarded is a subject for
legislative, not judicial, action.

The rights of the

handicapped, including the mentally retarded, are already
protected by legislation such as §S04 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29

u.s.c.

§794, and the Texas Mentally Retarded

Persons Act of 1977, Tex. Civil Code Ann. Art. SS47-300.
Finally, petrs challenge the reasoning that led the CAS
to conclude that the mentally retarded should be teated as a
quasi-suspect class.

They argue that the public is much more

enlightened today than in the past as to the nature of mental
retardation, that the mentally retarded are no longer a
politically powerless group, and that their condition is
significantly dissimilar from the population generally.
Resps argue that there is no conflict and that this Court
should await more decisions in the lower courts.

They argue

that California Association of the Physically Handicapped and
Sibley both involved physical handicaps and not mental
retardation.

They further argue that the CAS's decision is a

narrow one dealing with "intentional, invidious
discrimination" and exclusion from "the enjoyment of a basic
benefit available to nearly everyone else--the right to live
in a community."

It does not involve judicial interference

with allocation of public resources or a balancing between the
needs of mentally retarded persons and the needs of others.
Moreover, the impact of the decision will be limited as many
state legislatures are passing state zoning laws ensuring the

- 6 availability of community-based living alternatives for
mentally retarded persons.

Finally, citing Plyler v. Doe, 457

U.S. 202 (1982), resps argue that the intermediate level of
scrutiny is approprite where persons not responsible for their
status are seeking access on equal terms to basic societal
benefits.
4.

DISCUSSION:

Resps are correct that the two circuit

cases cited by petrs deal with
mental retardation.
"'---·

---

~ al

handicaps and

n~

Moreover, these cases merely hold that

-----.

the physically handicapped are not a suspect class and do not
address the possibility that they are a quasi-suspect class
entitled to an intermediate standard of review.

On the other

hand, four of the six Justices in the cert pool dissented in
Plyler, apparently rejecting an intermediate level of equal
protection scrutiny.

See 457

u.s.,

at 248 (Burger, C.J.,

dissenting), and this case seems to be a futher extension of

--------.....__

While there is not yet a full-blown
conflict in the circuits, this is an important case with
potentially far-reaching ramifications.
I recommend grant.
There is a response.
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To:

Justice Powell

From:

Annmar ie

Re:

No. 84-468

March 5, 1985
~
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City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center

'I 2-_7

Questions Presented
{1)

Did CAS err in holding that classifications based on mental

retardation

are

quasi-suspect

and

thus

subject

to

heightened

Equal

Protection

scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause?
( 2)

Does

Clause,

petr 's

either

zoning

on

relationship .. test?

I

'

its

ordinance
face

or

violate

as applied,

the

under

the

.. rational

2.

Discussion .
In

San

Antonio

School

District

v.

Rodriguez,

411

U.S.

1

(1973), your opinion for the Court described a "suspect" class as
one

"saddled

with

such

disabilities,

or

subjected

to

such

a

history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
prot~tion

The

from the majoritarian political process."

"traditional

whether

the

indicia

class

is

a

of

suspectness"

discrete

and

and

whether

membership

charcteristics.

in

Frontiero

the
v.

usually

insular

u.s.

States v. Carolene Products Co., 304

class

!d., at 28.
also

include

minority,

United

144, 152-53 n.4 (1938),
is

based

Richardson,

on

immutable

u.s.

411

677,

686

(1973).
to

--

demonstrate

that

mentally

retarded

individuals do not share many of the characteristics of suspect
classes

~-------------------------------------------------------is unconvincin •
For example, the fact that there are

varying
claim

degrees

that

the

of

mental

mentally

retardation

retarded

are

does
a

not

undermine

discrete

and

the

insular

Indeed, petrs' zoning ordinance apparently ~1

class

of

mentally

retarded

amorphous."

Likewise,

learn

things

to do

immutable.
not

go

the

does

individuals
fact

is

"large,

diverse

and

that the mentally retarded can

not mean

that

their

condition

is

not

I I

Mental retardation is a

away,

even

though

some

~earning

mentally

disabili!J that does
retarded

eventually can learn some things to some degree.

individuals

Petrs are right

that significant progress in assuring the rights of the mentally

l

~

3.

retarded

has

occurred

Still,

recently.

in

the

face

historical mistreatment suffered by this minority,
recent

successes

heightened

protection

necessary.

In sum,

mentally

..SG-

~

are

retarded

enough
from

I

to

the

ensure

that

political

of

the

I doubt that

some

process

degree

is

no

of

longer

think there is a strong argument that the

share

enough

of

the

characteristics

of

a

suspect class to make heightened review appropriate.
~-------------------------~
The SG takes a different approach in arguing for reversal •
~-------------------The SG argues that heightened scrutiny is never appropriate when

----

members

of

abilities

the

identified

that

are

class

relevant

to

t I

possess

proper

.......

needs

special

governmental

and

choices.

Since the mentally retarded do have special needs and abilities,
the

SG contends

that all legislation using

this classification

should be scrutinized by the rational relationship test.
relies

isolated
~

statements

u.s.

677

u.s.

307 (1976), for his view.

~r.--~~~

··~--

.t-1

on

-

(1973),

don't

~ precedents.
of

and Mass.

think

the

individual

Board

SG's

v
Both Frontiero

in

view

Frontiero
of

v.

The SG

Richardson,

Retirement

v.

Murgia,

compelled

by

the

is

has

requirement
should

and ~urgia do mention the relevance

characteristics

to

never

held,

however,

for

suspect

classes.

be established,

suspect classes.

the

427

Court's

the

ability

to

perform

society in distinguishing suspect from nonsuspect classes.
Court

411

Court

that
Even
need

this

is

if

such

not

impose

the
a

in
The

threshold
requirement

it on quasi-

Additionally when the challenged legislation or

governmental action does not involve one's ability to perform, it
is not clear why the relevance of a particular characteristic to

\

4.

the

ability

classes.

to

In

perform

sum,

should

think

I

be

the

the

-

SG' s

li trnus

argument

test

of

suspect

~nJ.y

shows

that

::::;:::::::..:

legislation treating the mentally retarded differently from other
people

to pass constitutional muster

even when

reviewed with strict or heightened scrutiny.
Although I believe that there is a strong case for affirming
CA8 's

holding

class,

that

the

mentally

retarded

are

a

quasi-suspect

I 'rn not sure whether the Court need reach this

issue in

-----~-----------------------------------~----------------------It appears that the City's action might fail even
case.
___.....

this

under

the

City's

rational

proffered

relationship
justifications

test.
for

At

least

denying

some

the

of

the

special

use

permit would apply equally whether the residents of the horne were
retarded or

not.

Others -- like

the attitudes of neighbors --

are attempts to justify discriminatory treatment because of the
existence of prejudice.

Thus, although some of the goals of the )

ordinance and the reasons for denying the permit sound perfectly
legitimate, they appear to have no relationship whatsoever to the
fact
check

~

that

the residents are mentally retarded.

the

record

on

point,

but

it

looks

like

the City's

action can be held unconstitutional as applied under the rational

~relationship

test.
----1 -------~
~~icus brief urgin
~·

this

I will have to

I

note

that

the

State

of

Texas

filed

an ~

J-

~'-

~

case

the

Finally, one of
is

Advocacy

---

moot.
notes

The
that

National
under

Ass'n

present

for
Texas

Rights
law,

Protection
the

group

and
horne

proposed by resps exceeds the maximum size and thus even if this
Court

finds

in

resps'

favor,

it will

have

no effect on

J

their

5.

ability

to open

the home.

According

to the amicus,

the lower

courts did not find

that a prior Texas regulation, under which

the

home

size

of

resp' s

was

despite the change in the law.

acceptable,

applied

in

this

case

I will have to consult the record

on this point.
Recommendation
I tentatively recommend affirming.

v~
84-468

CITY OF CLEBURNE v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER

Argued 3/18/85

',.
~

..

.

.•

/

?

7

~~~ ~~~ 4 '.!-L ~ ~1- ?
J-o~~~~~~

( q ~

/$r--

's:J 5'; -t)

r~~ ~4 ~,4;~ ~~

1-o ~ - ~ .;£t/~

or

~~~

( l . ~ 7o ~A.-~
-~~~~~~(
r

------~-

~~~~~~

~~~~
~~LuJ. . ~ .

?"at

k~~~

~ dd,/~~ ~ ~ _/.J-'U-rj~~'K.r.~

~~. (~~~

~~..,_,_,~...,_ a-~- ~ ~w

. so~~

'

.~ s~~~

4-r/,..U.. ,Lc,

..,..~~~~~

~

~~~

-~~ · (i;JTSD'G ~ ~
,~~~~~-~ ~~~

~~~~~''
~~

'-'t./

~ ~~-~~.

6 ~IV ti'Mtd ,. t4 ~ "14# ,..,~ fo-7-

\

/.fJ

/Ill ~

~ ??;../~
~~~

C/1 1-'

,4;

.

'

.

'

.

'

~g..~ ....... ~

s--¥No.

84-468

~~ ,
~1-~r
~-~--~ -~

Justice Brennan

rJv

~

~~ ~k_;z;,_

~~~--~~.
~~~~~~

~

Lr3'

r7-.~:-.4~~~ ~ t.-c..c.... ~~
~
:.--r:.~~~~...e.u

H,_z

.

~~A,/~""~~
Justice White

~~c· ~)

t14.,_ ~A,~ ~ ~/--,

~~C-CJ

Justice Marshall ·

Justice Blackmun

~~-~
'J.t..uf- ~

~ ~A.,~ . ~~--~/.,-~

JusticePowell

~A-4~

Ttt>

1-o

tC'

/f

{

~ ~ LZ;-1~

a._~ ~~

~~

rt:ri

~

J

'/-)~ ~

~~~~~I-:

..!1~~~4~~
->L~~ ~ ~~--;. "~ ~~
&-vd. ~ ~~
~~<"" t?<.,.~

~~t-R'k. ~ JJ~

· ..

.

.4 .

.,

,.

Justice Rehnquist

9t-- ~....;t..;;JZ

j2L.,/

'?1-<..~ ~I' /1-~ ~
~~1-.

~k~.n--~

~~~~~~"-uSC

Justice Stevens

~ ~ . ~~ ~

.Yf-~ ~ ~.~..~
o-r-d4

~~ ~~.

~
~

4<i

J::<-c-f

t:'-~~

~~.J·~~~~~

~ ~ d~.,·~~~~

JusticeO'Connor ~"

J€.,~ ~

Llf+..;x,...

f

.h'a..~ /)~

/,1~~~4 ~ ~ ~~L/ ~
~~r-~ . ~ ~

J

~

7'/A
tf'f-4~X'

Clfi~
~

t .F.P.

~,yo

~19j~v . ~~~

.;... crts ~ n..J~~~~·~

~ =~-~~.,.~h£._~
;:t;~·

.

-t.-

fA.,~ ,lo

.

~~

C/1~ ~ ~ ~ ~~

(Y;;;..u.,_

wj~~~~~~~~~

~~~ex..~ ~-t..,4p.

~

To:

Justice Powell

From: Annmarie
Re:

No. 84-468, City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living

After hearing the oral argument, my recommendation is
to affirm CAS on the ground that the mentally retarded

··------

should be treated as a quasi-suspect class.
~

I think it is

clear that the mentally retarded share the characteristics
identified in the Court's decisions as those triggering
strict scrutiny.

As you described suspect classes in San

Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, suspect class are
those that have been "saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process."

411

u.s.

1, 28 (1973).

The "tradition-

al indicia of suspectness" also include whether the class is
~

"a discrete and insular minority", United States v. Carolene
Products, 304

u.s.

144, 152-153 n.4 (1938), and whether

class membership is based on immutable characteristics.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411

'

u.s.

'

t

677, 686 (1973).

I don't

2.
think a convincing argument can be made that the mentally
retarded do not have these characteristics.
Only two arguments were raised against finding the mentally retarded to be a quasi-suspect class: (1) a general
objection that the Court should not expand the number of
classes that receive heightened scrutiny; (2) a claim that
mental retardation is different from other suspect classes
because it frequently relates to the ability to perform in
society.

I am not persuaded by either of these objections.

It is true, of course, that the application of heightened
scrutiny entails "extraordinary protection" from the democratic process and thus that the Court should impose it only
when absolutely necessary.

When a class satisfies the cri-

teria the Court has established for heightened scrutiny,
however, I don't think a general reluctance to expand the
number of groups subject to this protection is a sufficient
to hold otherwise.
The relationship between mental retardation and the
ability to perform in society is irrelevant to the question
whether the mentally retarded should be a quasi-suspect
class.

The Court has never held that the lack of any rela-

tionship between a characteristic and the ability to perform
is a threshold requirement for such status.

Moreover, the

fact that such a relationship may exist means only that legislation based on the difference to perform will pass constitutional muster, even under heightened scrutiny.

The

fact that mental retardation sometimes may be a proper basis

3.

for a legislative classification is a good reason to make
the class quasi-suspect instead of suspect; it is not a good
reason to find that the mentally retarded should receive no
heightened scrunity at all.
For these reasons, I would affirm CAS.

tJ
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Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Marshall
Blackmun
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens
O'Connor
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Justice White
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-468

CITY OF CLEBURNE, TEXAS, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1985]

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
A Texas city denied a special use permit for the operation
of a group home for the mentally retarded, acting pursuant to
a municipal zoning ordinance requiring permits for such
homes. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
mental retardation is a "quasi: suspect" classification and that
the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
did not substantially further an important governmental purpose. Because we conclude that a lesser standard of scruti~iate, we reverse and remand · for
reconsideration.

-- -

I
In July, 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building
at 201 Featherston Street in the city of Cleburne, Texas,
with the intention of leasing it to Cleburne Living Centers,
Inc. (CLC), 1 for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. It was anticipated that the home would
house thirteen retarded men and women, who would be
under the constant supervision of CLC staff members. The
Cleburne Living Centers, Inc., is now known as Community Living
Concepts, Inc. Hannah is the Vice-President and part owner of CLC.
For convenience, both Hannah and CLC will be referred to as "CLC." A
third respondent is Advocacy, Inc. , a non-profit corporation that provides
legal services to developmentally disabled persons.
1

.

84-468-0PINION
2

CLEBURNE v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER

house had four bedrooms and two baths, with a half bath to
be added. CLC planned to comply with all applicable state
·
and federal regulations. 2
The city informed CLC that a special use permit would be
required for the operation of a group home at the site, and
CLC accordingly submitted a permit application. In response to a subsequent inquiry from CLC, the city explained
that under the zoning regulations applicable to the site, a special use permit, renewable annually, was required for the
construction of "[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded,
or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions." 3 The .city had determined that the proposed
2
It was anticipated that the home would be operated as a private Level
I Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded, or ICF-MR,
under a program providing for joint federal-State reimbursement for residential services for mentally retarded clients.
See 42 U. S. C.
§ 1396d(a)(15); Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 32.001 et seq. ICF-MR's are covered by extensive regulations and guidelines established by the United
States Department of Health and Human Services and the Texas Departments of Human Resources, Mental Health and Mental Retardation, and
Health. See App. 92. See also 42 CFR § 442 et seq.; 25 Tex. Adm. Code,
Title 40, § 27 et seq.
3
The site of the home is in an are-a zoned "R-3," an "Apartment House
District." App. 51. Section 8 of the Cleburne zoning ordinance, in pertinent part, allows the following uses in an R-3 district:
1. Any use permitted in District R-2.
2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings.
3. Boarding and lodging houses.
4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories.
5. Apartment hotels.
6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes or homes for convalescents or
aged, other than for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug
addicts.
----.
7. ~ivate clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is
carried on as a business.
8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other than penal
institutions.
9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses
"
App. 60-61 (emphasis added).

84-46S-OPINION
CLEBURNE v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER

v

3

group home should be classified as a "hospital for the feebleminded." After holding a public hearing on CLC's application, the city council voted three to one to deny a special use
permit. 4
CLC then filed suit in Federal District Court against the
city and a number of its officials, alleging, inter alia, that the
zoning ordinance was invalid on its face and as applied because it discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the equal protection rights of CLC and its potential
residents. The District Court found that "[i]f the potential
residents of the Featherston Street home were not mentally
retarded, but the home was the same in all other respects, its
use would be permitted under the city's zoning ordinance,"
and that the city council's decision "was motivated primarily
by the fact that the residents of the home would be persons
who are mentally retarded." App. at 93, 94. Even so, the
District Court held the ordinance and its application constitutional. Concluding that no fundamental right was implicated
and that mental retardation was neither a suspect nor a
quasi-suspect classification, the court employed the minimum
level of judicial scrutiny applicable to equal protection claims.
The court deemed the ordinahce, as written and applied, to
be rationally related to the City's legitimate interests in "the
legal responsibility of CLC and its residents, ... the safety
and fears of residents in the adjoining neighborhood," and the
Section 16 of the ordinance specifies the uses for which a special use permit may be issued. These include "[h]ospitals for the insane or feebleminded, or alcoholic or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions."
App. 63. Section 16 provides that a permit for such a use may be issued by
"the Governing Body, after public hearing, and after recommendation of
the Planning Commission." All special use permits are limited to one
year, and each applicant is required "to obtain the signatures of the property owners within two hundred (200) feet of the property to be used."
!d.
• The City's Planning and Zoning Commission had earlier held a hearing
and voted to deny the permit. App. 91.
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number of people to be housed in the home. 5
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, determining that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification and that it should assess the validity of the ordinance
under intermediate-level scrutiny. 726 F. 2d 191 (1984).
Because mental retardation was in fact relevant to many legislative actions, strict scrutiny was not appropriate. But in
light of the history of "unfair and often grotesque mistreatment" of the retarded, discrimination against them was
"likely to reflect deep-seated prejudice." I d., at 197. In addition, the mentally retarded lacked political power, and their
condition was immutable. The court considered heightened
scrutiny to be particularly appropriate in this case, because
the City's ordinance withheld a benefit which, although not
fundamental, was very important to the mentally retarded.
Without group homes, the court stated, the retarded could
never hope to integrate themselves into the community. 6
Applying the test that it considered appropriate, the court
held that the ordinance was invalid on its face because it did
not substantially further any important governmental interests. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the· ordinance was also invalid as applied. 7 We granted certiorari,

--- --

..,
The District Court also rejected,CLC's other claims, including the argument that the City had violated due process by improperly delegating its
zoning powers to the owners of adjoining property. Cf. State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116 (1928). App.
105. The Court of Appeals did not address this argument, and it has not
been raised by the parties in this Court.
6
The District Court had found that
"[g]roup homes currently are the principal community living alternatives
for persons who are mentally retarded. The availability of such a home in
communities is an essential ingredient of normal living patterns for persons
who are mentally retarded, and each factor that makes such group homes
harder to establish operates to exclude persons who are mentally retarded
from the community." App. 94.
7
The City relied on a recently passed State regulation limiting group
homes to six residents in support of its argument that the CLC home would
be overcrowded with thirteen. But, the Court of Appeals observed, the
5
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-u.s.- (1984).

5

8

II
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which
is essentially a direction~t all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 216
(1982). Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to
enforce this mandate, but absent controlling Congressional
direction, the Courts have themselves devised standards for
City had failed to justify its apparent view that any other group of thirteen
people could live under these allegedly "crowded" conditions, nor had it explained why six would be acceptable but thirteen not.
CLC concedes that it could not qualify for certification under the new
Texas regulation. Tr. Oral Arg. 31 (April 23, 1985). The Court of Appeals stated that the new regulation applied only to applications made after
May 1, 1982, and therefore did not apply to the CLC home. 726 F. 2d, at
202. The regulation itself contains no grandfather clause, see App. 78-81,
and the District Court made no specific finding. on this point. See App. 96.
However, the State has asserted in an amicus brief filed in this Court that
"'the six bed rule' would not pose an obstacle to the proposed Featherston
Street group home at issue in this case." Brief for the State of Texas and
the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation as Amici
Curiae 15, n. 7. If the six-bed requirement were to apply to the home,
there is a serious possibility that CLC would no longer be interested in injunctive relief. David Southern, an officer of CLC, testifed that "to break
even on a facility of this type, you have to have at least ten or eleven residents." App. 32. However, because CLC requested damages as well as
an injunction, see App. 15, the case would not be moot.
8
Macon Association for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County
Planning and Zoning Commisssion, 314 S. E. 2d 218 (Ga.), dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question,-- U. S. - - (1984), has no controlling effect on this case. Macon Association for Retarded Citizens involved an ordinance that had the effect of excluding a group home for the
retarded only because it restricted dwelling units to those occupied by a
single family, defined as no more than four unrelated persons. In Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), we upheld the constitutionality
of a similar ordinance, and the Georgia Supreme Court in M aeon Association specifically held that the ordinance did not discriminate against the retarded. 314 S. E. 2d, at 221.
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determining the validity of state legislation or other offical
action that is challenged as denying equal protection. The
general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to al e t imate stateiirterest. SchweiTCer
v. Wi son, 450 U. S. 221, 230 (198 ; me tates Railroad
Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174-175 (1980);
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976). When social or economic
legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the
states wide latitude, United States Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz, supra, at 174 (1980); New Orleans v. Dukes,
supra, at 303, and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.
The general rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage or n.ational origin. These factors are
so seldom relevantTo the achi~ement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those
in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. For these reasons and ,because such discrimination is
unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws
are subjected to strict scru...!.!Ey and will be sustained OElY if
they are ffiiifa6ly tailored to a serve a compelling state
intersts. McLaug'7rliri:V:Florta a, 379 U. S. 184, 192 (1964);
Granam v. Richardson, 403 U. S. ?65 (1971). Similar oversight by the courts is due when state laws impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution. Kramer v.
Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U. S. 621 (1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942).
Legislative classifications based on gender also call for
somewhat heightened standards of review. That factor generally provides no sensible ground for differential treatment.
"[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as

''* •

l, ,

f

~~
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intelligence or physical disability . . . is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relationship to ability to perform
or contribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U. S. 677, 686 (1973)(plurality opinion). Rather than resting
on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits
and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely
reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men
and women.
Strict scrutin is not a propriate in such
cases, but the law a1 s un ess it is substantially related to a
Sufficiently important governmental interest. Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1971). Because illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control and bears "no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society,"
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 505 (1976), official discriminations resting on that characteristic are also subject to
somewhat heightened review. Those restrictions "will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent that they are
substantially related to a legitimate state interest." Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U. S. 91, 99 (1982).
We have declined, however, to extend heightened review
to differential treatment based on age:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not
been wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike,
say, those who have been discriminated against on the
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. ~<-The lesson o~---u;;--;s that where individuals in the group
affected by a l~stinguishing characteristics relevant
to interests the state has the authority to implement, the
courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether,
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how and to ·what extent those interests should be pursued.
In such cases, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a rational means to serve a legitimate end.

III
Against this background, we conclude for several reasons
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding mentally retarded
individuals a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is normally accorded
economic and social legislation. First, it is undeniable, and
it is not argued otherwise here, that those who are mentally
retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in
the everyday world. Nor are they all cut from the same pattern: as the testimony in this record indicates, they range
from those whose disability is not immediately evident to
those who must be constantly cared for. 9 They are thus different, immutably so, in relevant respects, and the states' interest in dealing with and providing for them is plainly a
9
•
Mentally retarded i~dividuals fall into four distinct categories. The
vast majority-approximately 89o/o-are classified as "mildly'' retarded,
meaning that their IQ is between 50 and 70. Approximately 6% percent
are "moderately" retarded, with IQs between 35 and 50. The remaining
two categories are "severe" (IQs of 20 to 35) and "profound" (IQs below
20). These last two categories together account for about 5% of the mentally retarded population. App. 39 (Testimony of Dr. Philip Roos).
Mental retardation is not defined by reference to intelligence or IQ
alone, however. The American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD)
has defined mental retardation as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior
and manifested during the developmental period." Brief for AAMD et a!.
as Amici Curiae 3 (quoting AAMD, Classification in Mental Retardation 1
(H. Grossman ed. 1983)). "Deficits in adaptive behavior" are limitations
on general ability to meet the standards of maturation, learning, personal
independence, and social responsibility expected for an individual's age
level and cultural group. Id., at 4, n. 1. Mental retardation is caused by
a variety of factors, some genetic, some environmental, and some unknown. Id., at 4.
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legitmate one. 10 How this large and diversified group is to
be treated under the law is a difficult and often a technical
matter, very much a task for legislators guided by qualified
professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of
the judiciary. Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive judgments about legislative decisions, and we doubt
that the predicate for such judicial oversight is present where
the classification deals with mental retardation.
Second, the distinctive legislative response, both national
and state, to the plight of those who are mentally retarded
demonstrates not only that they have unique problems, but
also that the lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight
by the judiciary. Thus, the federal government has not only
outlawed discrimination against the mentally retarded in federally funded programs, see Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, but it has also provided the
retarded with the right to receive "appropriate treatment,
services, and habilitation" in a setting that is "least restrictive of [their] personal liberty." Developmental Disabilities
and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6010(1), (2). In addition, the government has conditioned federal education funds
on a State's assurance that retarded children will enjoy an
education that, "to the maximum extent appropriate," is integrated with that of non-mentally retarded children. EducaAs Dean Ely has observed:
"Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something he or she
can't do anything about, but I'm not aware of any reason to suppose that
elected officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling. Moreover,
classifications based on physical disability and intelligence are typically accepted as legitimate, even by judges and commentators who assert that immutability is relevant. The explanation, when one is given, is that those
characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is trying to render suspect) are often relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point there's not
much left of the immutability theory, is there?" J. Ely, Democracy and
Distrust 150 (1980) (footnote omitted). See also id., at 154-155.
10

I
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tion of the Handicapped Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1412(5)(B). The
government has also facilitated the hiring of the mentally retarded into the federal civil service by exempting them from
the requirement of competitive examination. See 5 CFR
§ 213-3102(t) (1984). The State of Texas has similarly enacted legislation that acknowledges the special status of the
mentally retarded by conferring certain rights upon them,
such as "the right to live in the least restrictive setting appropriate to [their] individual needs and abilities," including "the
right to live ... in a group home." Mentally Retarded Persons Act of 1977, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5547-300,
§ 7.11
Such legislation thus singling out the retarded for special
treatment reflects the real and undeniable differences between the retarded and others. That a civilized and decent
society expects and approves such legislation indicates that
governmental consideration of those differences in the vast
majority of situations is not only legitimate but desirable. It
may be, as CLC contends, that legislation designed to benefit, rather than disadvantage, the retarded would generally
withstand examination under a test of heightened scrutiny.
See Brief for Respondents 38-41. The relevant inquiry,
however, is whether heightened scrutiny is constitutionally
mandated in the first instance. Even assuming that many of
these laws could be shown to be substantially related to an
important governmental purpose, merely requiring the legislature to justify its efforts in these terms may lead it to refrain from acting at all. Much recent legislation intended to
benefit the retarded also assumes the need for measures that
11

CLC originally sought relief under the Act, but voluntarily dismissed
this pendent state claim when the District Court indicated that its presence
might make abstention appropriate. The Act had never been construed
by the Texas courts. App. 12, 14, 84-87.
A number of states have passed legislation prohibiting zoning that excludes the retarded. See, e. g., Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 1566 et seq.;
Conn. Gen Stat. § 8-3e; N. D. C. C. § 25-16-14(2); R. I. Gen. Laws. Tit.
45, ch. 24 § 22. See also Md. Ann. Code, Health-General Article, § 7-102.
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might be perceived to disadvantage them. The Education of
the Handicapped Act, for example, requires an "appropriate"
education, not one that is equal in all respects to the education of non-retarded children; clearly, admission to a class
that exceeded the abilities of a retarded child would not be
appropriate. 12 Similarly, the Developmental Disabilities Act
and the Texas act give the retarded the right to live only in
the "least restrictive setting" appropriate to their abilities,
implicitly assuming the need for at least some restrictions
that would not be imposed on others. 13 Especially given the
wide variation in the abilities and needs of the retarded themselves, governmental bodies must have a certain amount of
flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and
limiting their remedial efforts.
Third, the legislative response, which could hardly have occurred and survived without public support, negates any
claim that the mentally r~tarded are politically powerless in
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of
the lawmakers. Any minority can be said to be powerless to
assert direct control over the legislature, but if that were a
criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts, much economic and social iegislation would now be suspect.
Fourth, if the lar e and amor hous class of the mentally
retarded were deemed quasi--suspect for the reasons given by
the Court o ppea s, 1t wou d e 1fficult to find a principled
way to distinggish a var1et of otner groups wno have perom others, who
haps immuta e d1sa ilities set mg em o
cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses,
and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part
l2 The Act, which specifically included the mentally retarded in its definition of handicapped, see 20 U. S. C. § 1401(1), also recognizes the great
variations within the classification of retarded children. The Act requires
that school authorities devise an "individualized eduational program," id.,
at § 1401(19), that is "tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped
child." Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 181 (1982).
13
The Developmental Disabilities Act also prohibits the use of physical
restraint "unless absolutely necessary." 42 U. S. C. § 6010(2) .

.,
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of t~e
ublic at.~ One need me tion in this res ect only
the agin the ~, the entail 11, and th mfirm We
are re uctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do
so.
Doubtless, there have been and there will continue to be
instances of discrimination against the retarded that are in
fact invidious, and that are proP,erly subject to judicial correction under constitutional norms. But the appropriate
method of reaching such instances is not to create a new
quasi-suspect classification and subject all governmental action based on that classification to more searching evaluation.
Rather, we should look to the likelihood that governmental
action premised on a particular classification is valid as a general matter, not merely to the specifics of the case before us.
Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the government may legitimately take into account in a wide range
of decisions, and because both state and federal governments
have recently committed themselves to assisting the retarded , we will not presume that any given legislative action,
even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in
considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate.
'IV
Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect
class does not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious
discrimination. To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and
others mu~t be ~nal!x 1.~ted to a legitimate governn1s standard, we believe, affords governmental purpose.
ment the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed
to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, 'and to
freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the retarded in what is essentially an incidental manner. The
State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an
asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55,
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61-63; United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U. S. 528, 535 (1973). Furthermore, some objectivessuch as "a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group," Moreno, 413 U. S., at 534-are not legitimate state
interests. See also Zabel, supra, 457 U. S., at 63. Beyond
that, the mentally retarded, like others, have and retain their
substantive constitutional rights in addition to the right to be
treated equally by the law. Our decision today in no way affects those rights.
The Court of Appeals, having settled on an intermediate
level of scrutiny, did not attempt to assess the validity of the
City's actions under the rational relationship standard. The
application of the proper test is a task that we leave to the
Court of Appeals in the first instance, particularly because
the question is one "clouded by an ambiguity in state law." 14
·· G. D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U. S. 404, 413 (1982). Cf.
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345-346 (1976); Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 524, and n. 2 (1972).
The case is accordingly reversed and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The State of Texas and the State Deparment of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation (TDMHMR) have submitted a brief as amici curiae in
this Court, arguing that the city's denial of a special use permit runs
counter to the State's policy favoring the establishment of group homes for
the mentally retarded. See Mentally Retarded Persons Act of 1977, Tex.
Rev. Civ. art. 5547-300. Furthermore, the State asserts that the city
may not legitimately use its zoning powers to further the welfare of the
retarded themselves, as distinguished from the welfare of the surrounding
community. The State contends that judgments as to the ability of the
retarded to live in a group home in a residential neighborhood lie within the
exclusive province of the appropriate State agencies, and are not included
within the purposes that have been delegated to the city as valid objectives
of municipal zoning legislation. Brief for the State of Texas and the
TDMHMR as Amici Curiae 13-14. The State did not raise these arguments below, Tr. of Oral Arg. 30 (March 18, 1985), and we decline to address them or assess their significance.
1
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To:
From:
Re:

1 read Justice White's opinion in this case. Although 1 am
sympathetic to the view that the mentally retarded should be
treated as a quasi-suspect class, 1 think the opinion does a good
job of explaining why the Court will not accord the class such
status. The opinion is in accord with your position on this
issue.
1 am troubled, however, by the opinion's decision to remand
the case.
1 don't think the opinion offers a satisfactory
justification for this disposition. On the very last page, the
opinion notes that the CA "did not attempt to assess the validity
of the City's actions under the rational relationship standard."
Justice White asserts that this legal question should be left to
the CA "in the first instance, particularly because the question
is one clouded by an ambiguity in state law." 1n a footnote he
explains that the Court will not address the arguments raised in
an amicus brief by the State of Texas concerning state law
because the State did not raise them below.
1 have several
problems with this approach.
First, there are two different questions to be addressed
once the Court decides that the rational basis test is
appropriate: (1) the facial validity of the City's ordinance; (2)
the validity of the ordinance as applied. While I can see why
the Court might want to let the CA have the first look at whether
the ordinance is rational as applied, I don't see a good reason
for doing so with respect to the facial chalLenge. The facial
cha leng
ere an invo ves a stra1 htforward legal
question.
has never offered an basis, rational or
ot~se, for
·
rd'nance draws.
It has
never sought o justify, for example, its treating alcohoics,
drug addicts, and the mentally retarded alike, and differently
from the other classes in the ordinance. The facial problems
with the ordinance exist quite apart from any question of state
law.
Second, Justice White's opinion states that it will not
address the state law question because the State did not make
this argument below.
If the State did not make the argument

below, why should the CA address it on remand? And if the CA
isn't going to address it on remand, why the remand?

yoJf

As I understand your position at Conference,
thought
that the case should either be decided here
·~
vall
st on or remanded.
From talking to Justice
Marshal!'s c erk, I understand that he plans to circulate an
opinion holding the ordinance invalid on 3 different rationales
-- quasi-suspect class, facial rational basis, as applied. The
opinion is supposed to be written to allow individual Justices to
join only one rationale. In light of the problems with the
remand, I recommend that you wait for Justice Marshall's opinion.

1 Justice Marshall was assigned to write the dissent in
this case, but his o~~~on could become the opinion of the Court.
Apparently, Justice ~~ens is planning to circulate a memo
stating that he will join an opinion holding the ordinance
facially invalid. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun
accept this position as a minimum.
If you joined this view, it
would be the majority position.

.
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Annmarie

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

June 3, 1985

84-468 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
As you will see from the draft of my letter to
Justice White, I agree that there is no reason why this
Court should not decide the facial issue.

Nevertheless, my

guess is that BRW will get a Court for his opinion remanding
the entire case to the Court of Appeals.
As time is running out in this Term, and as you
are not too pressed, I suggest that you prepare a brief
opinion concurring and dissenting.
BRW rather promptly.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

We may well hear from
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CHAMI!SERS 01"

.JUSTICE
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BRENNAN , .JR.

June 3, 1985

No.

84-468

City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center

Dear Byron,
I'll await the dissent in the
above.
Sincerely,
~

'

f;4tt
Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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June 3, 1985
Re:

No. 84-468

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center

Dear Byron,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice White
cc:

The Conference
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Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

June 3, 1985

84-468 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.
As you will see from the draft of mv letter to
Justice White, I agree that there is no reason '"hy this
Court should not necide the facial issue.

Nevertheless, my

quess is that

o~inion

B~l

will get a Court for his

remanding

the entire case to the Court of Appeals.
As time is running out in this Term, and as vou
are not too oressed,

I

suggest

t~at

opin:f.on concurring and dissenting.
BRW rather oromptlv.

I-. F. P., Jr.

ss

you PrePare a brief
We may well hear from

To:
Justice Powell
From: Annmarie
Re:
No. 84-468, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
I read your letter to Justice White explaining why you think
the Court should rule that the ordinance at issue is facially
invalid.
I think this is the right result, and that the letter
makes a persuasive case for it.
If there are five votes for holding the ordinance facially
invalid, and I think there will be, then there is no need to
reach the question whet er the mental~~~ded ar~ a quasisuspect class.
ust1ce hite's op1 10n is devoted a md st
en ~ discussing why heightened scrutiny is not the
appropriate test. This discussion addresses the reasoning of the
CA, but it is unnecessary to the decision that the ordinance is
facially invalid. Thus, I'm not sure that you would want to join
any part of Justice White's opinion as it now stands.

1

Your letter doesn't say that you'll join Justice White's
opinion if he simply adds a section on facial invalidity, but it
could be interpreted that way.
If you agree that the Court need
not reach the quasi-s~pe£t_Q lass~uestion, then you might want
to condition your w1Til ngness t o join Justice White's opinion
eeRtiR~~~on his changing entirely the focus of the draft.
I
understand why you may not want to do that, · but this approach
1
ec ing unnecessarily a constitutional question.
Steve
circulated a memo today that seems to take the
--~~~~

I will be happy to draft a short opinion in case you want
to write separately.
r
~

ar"m "f tlrt ~ttb .;ltatt•
·-Jrittllhtn. ~. ar. 21lc?'!~

.-upunu
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 3, 1985

Re:

84-468 - City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center

Dear Byron:
Although I agree that there was no need for the
Court of Appeals to apply the "somewhat heightened"
standard of review in order to reach the conclusion
that discrimination against the mentally retarded
evidenced by this record was unconstitutional, I
continue to believe that the Court should decide the
merits of the case and affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
In all events, I shall await further writing and
perhaps add a few words of my own.
Respectfully,

Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

- pp. 6 ' 7 & stylistic changes

1ft

~

Justice White

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated:JI=IIt:..::...._4_ _~----

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-468
CITY OF CLEBURNE, TEXAS, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1985]

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
A Texas city denied a special use permit for the operation
of a group home for the mentally retarded, acting pursuant to
a municipal zoning ordinance requiring permits for such
homes. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
mental retardation is a "quasi-suspect" classification and that
the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
did not substantially further an important governmental
purpose. Because we conclude that a lesser standard of
scrutiny is appropriate, we reverse and remand for
reconsideration.
I
In July, 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building
at 201 Featherston Street in the city of Cleburne, Texas,
with the intention of leasing it to Cleburne Living Centers,
Inc. (CLC), I for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. It was anticipated that the home would
house 13 retarded men and women, who would be under the
constant supervision of CLC staff members. The house had
1
Cleburne Living Centers, Inc., is now known as Community Living
Concepts, Inc. Hannah is the Vice-President and part owner of CLC.
For convenience, both Hannah and CLC will be referred to as "CLC." A
third respondent is Advocacy, Inc., a non-profit corporation that provides
legal services to developmentally disabled persons.
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four bedrooms and two baths, with a half bath to be added.
CLC planned to comply with all applicable state and federal
regulations. 2
The city informed CLC that a special use permit would be
required for the operation of a group home at the site, and
CLC accordingly submitted a permit application. In response to a subsequent inquiry from CLC, the city explained
that under the zoning regulations applicable to the site, a special use permit, renewable annually, was required for the
construction of "[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded,
or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions." 3 The city had determined that the proposed
2

It was anticipated that the home would be operated as a private Level
I Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded, or ICF-MR,
under a program providing for joint federal-State reimbursement for residential services for mentally retarded clients.
See 42 U. S. C.
§ 1396d(a)(15); Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 32.001 et seq. ICF-MR's are covered by extensive regulations and guidelines established by the United
States Department of Health and Human Services and the Texas Departments of Human Resources, Mental Health and Mental Retardation, and
Health. See App. 92. See also 42 CFR § 442 et seq.; 25 Tex. Adm. Code,
Title 40, § 27 et seq.
8
The site of the home is in an area zoned "R-3," an "Apartment House
District." App. 51. Section 8 of the Cleburne zoning ordinance, in pertinent part, allows the following uses in an R-3 district:
1. Any use permitted in District R-2.
2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings.
3. Boarding and lodging houses.
4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories.
5. Apartment hotels.
6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes or homes for convalescents or
aged, other than for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug
addicts.
7. Private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is
carried on as a business.
8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other than penal
institutions.
9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses ... "
App. 60-61 (emphasis added).
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group home should be classified as a "hospital for the feebleminded." After holding a public hearing on CLC's application, the city council voted three to one to deny a special use
permit. 4
CLC then filed suit in Federal District Court against the
city and a number of its officials, alleging, inter alia, that the
zoning ordinance was invalid on its face and as applied because it discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the equal protection rights of CLC and its potential
residents. The District Court found that "[i]f the potential
residents of the Featherston Street home were not mentally
retarded, but the home was the same in all other respects, its
use would be permitted under the city's zoning ordinance,"
and that the city council's decision "was motivated primarily
by the fact that the residents of the home would be persons
who are mentally retarded." App. at 93, 94. Even so, the
District Court held the ordinance and its application constitutional. Concluding that no fundamental right was implicated
and that mental retardation was neither a suspect nor a
quasi-suspect classification, the court employed the minimum
level of judicial scrutiny applicable to equal protection claims.
The court deemed the ordinance, as written and applied, to
be rationally related to the City's legitimate interests in "the
legal responsibility of CLC and its residents, ... the safety
and fears of residents in the adjoining neighborhood," and the
Section 16 of the ordinance specifies the uses for which a special use permit may be issued. These include "[h]ospitals for the insane or feebleminded, or alcoholic or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions."
App. 63. Section 16 provides that a permit for such a use may be issued by
"the Governing Body, after public hearing, and after recommendation of
the Planning Commission." All special use permits are limited to one
year, and each applicant is required "to obtain the signatures of the property owners within two hundred (200) feet of the property to be used."
Ibid.
• The City's Planning and Zoning Commission had earlier held a hearing
and voted to deny the permit. App. 91.
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number of people to be housed in the home. 5
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, determining that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification and that it should assess the validity of the ordinance
under intermediate-level scrutiny. 726 F. 2d 191 (1984).
Because mental retardation was in fact relevant to many legislative actions, strict scrutiny was not appropriate. But in
light of the history of "unfair and often grotesque mistreatment" of the retarded, discrimination against them was
"likely to reflect deep-seated prejudice." !d., at 197. In addition, the mentally retarded lacked political power, and their
condition was immutable. The court considered heightened
scrutiny to be particularly appropriate in this case, because
the City's ordinance withheld a benefit which, although not
fundamental, was very important to the mentally retarded.
Without group homes, the court stated, the retarded could
never hope to integrate themselves into the community. 6
Applying the test that it considered appropriate, the court
held that the ordinance was invalid on its face because it did
not substantially further any important governmental interests. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the ordinance was also invalid as applied. 7 We granted certiorari,
&The District Court also rejected CLC's other claims, including the argument that the City had violated due process by improperly delegating its
zoning powers to the owners of adjoining property. Cf. State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116 (1928). App.
105. The Court of Appeals did not address this argument, and it has not
been raised by the parties in this Court.
6
The District Court had found that
"[g]roup homes currently are the principal community living alternatives
for persons who are mentally retarded. The availability of such a home in
communities is an essential ingredient of normal living patterns for persons
who are mentally retarded, and each factor that makes such group homes
harder to establish operates to exclude persons who are mentally retarded
from the community." App. 94.
7
The City relied on a recently passed State regulation limiting group
homes to six residents in support of its argument that the CLC home would
be overcrowded with thirteen. But, the Court of Appeals observed, the
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5

8

II

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which
is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 216
(1982). Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to
enforce this mandate, but absent controlling Congressional
direction, the Courts have themselves devised standards for
City had failed to justify its apparent view that any other group of thirteen
people could live under these allegedly "crowded" conditions, nor had it explained why six would be acceptable but thirteen not.
CLC concedes that it could not qualify for certification under the new
Texas regulation. Tr. Oral Arg. 31 (April 23, 1985). The Court of Appeals stated that the new regulation applied only to applications made after
May 1, 1982, and therefore did not apply to the CLC home. 726 F. 2d, at
202. The regulation itself contains no grandfather clause, see App. 78-81,
and the District Court made no specific finding on this point. See App. 96.
However, the State has asserted in an amicus brief filed in this Court that
" 'the six bed rule' would not pose an obstacle to the proposed Featherston
Street group home at issue in this case." Brief for the State of Texas and
the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation as Amici
Curiae 15, n. 7. If the six-bed requirement were to apply to the home,
there is a serious possibility that cr..c would no longer be interested in injunctive relief. David Southern, an officer of CLC, testifed that "to break
even on a facility of this type, you have to have at least ten or eleven residents." App. 32. However, because CLC requested damages as well as
an injunction, see App. 15, the case would not be moot.
8
Macon Association for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County
Planning and Zoning Commisssion, 314 S. E. 2d 218 (Ga.), dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question,-- U. S. - - (1984), has no controlling effect on this case. Macon Association for Retarded Citizens involved an ordinance that had the effect of excluding a group home for the
retarded only because it restricted dwelling units to those occupied by a
single family, defined as no more than four unrelated persons. In Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 (1974), we upheld the constitutionality
of a similar ordinance, and the Georgia Supreme Court in Macon Association specifically held that the ordinance did not discriminate against the retarded. 314 S. E. 2d, at 221.
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determining the validity of state legislation or other offical
action that is challenged as denying equal protection. The
general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Schweiker
v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 230 (1981); United States Railroad
Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174-175 (1980);
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976). When social or economic
legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the
states wide latitude, United States Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz, supra, at 174 (1980); New Orleans v. Dukes,
supra, at 303, and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.
The general rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage or national origin. These factors are
so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those
in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. For these reasons and because such discrimination is
unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws
are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if
they are suitably tailored to a serve a compelling state
intersts. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 192 (1964);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971). Similar oversight by the courts is due when state laws impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution. Kramer v.
Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U. S. 621 (1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942).
Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a
heightened standard of review. That factor generally provides no sensible ground for differential treatment. "[W]hat
differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelli-

I
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gence or physical disability . . . is that the sex characteristic
frequently bears no relationship to ability to perform or contribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677,
686 (1973) (plurality opinion). Rather than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect
outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and (
women.
A gender classification fails unless it is substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S.
718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1971). Because
illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control and bears "no
relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society," Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 505
(1976), official discriminations resting on that characteristic
are also subject to somewhat heightened review. Those restrictions "will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent that they are substantially related to a legitimate state
interest." Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U. S. 91, 99 (1982).
We have declined, however, to extend heightened review
to differential treatment based on age:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not
been wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike,
say, those who have been discriminated against on the
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped '
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
u. s. 307, 313 (1976).
The lesson of Murgia is that where individuals in the group
affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant
to interests the state has the authority to implement, the
courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of pow-
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ers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether,
how and to what extent those interests should be pursued.
In such cases, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a rational means to serve a legitimate end.

III
Against this background, we conclude for several reasons
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding mentally retarded
individuals a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is normally accorded
economic and social legislation. First, it is undeniable, and
it is not argued otherwise here, that those who are mentally
retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in
the everyday world. Nor are they all cut from the same pattern: as the testimony in this record indicates, they range
from those whose disability is not immediately evident to
those who must be constantly cared for. 9 They are thus different, immutably so, in relevant respects, and the states' interest in dealing with and providing for them is plainly a
Mentally retarded individuals fall into four distinct categories. The
vast majority-approximately 89%-are classified as "mildly" retarded,
meaning that their IQ is between 50 and 70. Approximately 6% percent
are "moderately'' retarded, with IQs between 35 and 50. The remaining
two categories are "severe" (IQs of 20 to 35) and "profound" (IQs below
20). These last two categories together account for about 5% of the mentally retarded population. App. 39 (Testimony of Dr. Philip Roos).
Mental retardation is not defined by reference to intelligence or IQ
alone, however. The American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD)
has defined mental retardation as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior
and manifested during the developmental period." Brief for AAMD et al.
as Amici Curiae 3 (quoting AAMD, Classification in Mental Retardation 1
(H. Grossman ed. 1983)). "Deficits in adaptive behavior" are limitations
on general ability to meet the standards of maturation, learning, personal
independence, and social responsibility expected for an individual's age
level and cultural group. Id., at 4, n. 1. Mental retardation is caused by
a variety of factors, some genetic, some environmental, and some unknown. Id., at 4.
9
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legitmate one. 10 How this large and diversified group is to
be treated under the law is a difficult and often a technical
matter, very much a task for legislators guided by qualified
professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of
the judiciary. Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive judgments about legislative decisions, and we doubt
that the predicate for such judicial oversight is present where
the classification deals with mental retardation.
Second, the distinctive legislative response, both national
and state, to the plight of those who are mentally retarded
demonstrates not only that they have unique problems, but
also that the lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight
by the judiciary. Thus, the federal government has not only
outlawed discrimination against the mentally retarded in federally funded programs, see § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, but it has also provided the retarded
with the right to receive "appropriate treatment, services,
and habilitation" in a setting that is "least restrictive of
[their] personal liberty." Developmental Disabilities and
Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6010(1), (2). In addition,
the government has conditioned federal education funds on a
State's assurance that retarded children will enjoy an education that, "to the maximum extent appropriate," is integrated
with that of non-mentally retarded children. Education of
As Dean Ely has observed:
"Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something he or she
can't do anything about, but I'm not aware of any reason to suppose that
elected officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling. Moreover,
classifications based on physical disability and intelligence are typically accepted as legitimate, even by judges and commentators who assert that immutability is relevant. The explanation, when one is given, is that those
characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is trying to render suspect) are often relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point there's not
much left of the immutability theory, is there?" J. Ely, Democracy and
Distrust 150 (1980) (footnote omitted). See also id., at 154-155.
10
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the Handicapped Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1412(5)(B). The government has also facilitated the hiring of the mentally retarded
into the federal civil service by exempting them from the requirement of competitive examination.
See 5 CFR
§ 213-3102(t) (1984). The State of Texas has similarly enacted legislation that acknowledges the special status of the
mentally retarded by conferring certain rights upon them,
such as "the right to live in the least restrictive setting appropriate to [their] individual needs and abilities," including "the
right to live ... in a group home." Mentally Retarded Persons Act of 1977, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5547-300,
§ 7.11
Such legislation thus singling out the retarded for special
treatment reflects the real and undeniable differences between the retarded and others. That a civilized and decent
society expects and approves such legislation indicates that
governmental consideration of those differences in the vast
majority of situations is not only legitimate but desirable. It
may be, as CLC contends, that legislation designed to benefit, rather than disadvantage, the retarded would generally
withstand examination under a test of heightened scrutiny.
See Brief for Respondents 38-41. The relevant inquiry,
however, is whether heightened scrutiny is constitutionally
mandated in the first instance. Even assuming that many of
these laws could be shown to be substantially related to an
important governmental purpose, merely requiring the legislature to justify its efforts in these terms may lead it to refrain from acting at all. Much recent legislation intended to
benefit the retarded also assumes the need for measures that
CLC originally sought relief under the Act, but voluntarily dismissed
this pendent state claim when the District Court indicated that its presence
might make abstention appropriate. The Act had never been construed ·
by the Texas courts. App. 12, 14, 84-87.
A number of states have passed legislation prohibiting zoning that excludes the retarded. See, e. g., Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 1566 et seq.;
Conn. Gen Stat. § 8-3e; N. D. C. C. § 25-16-14(2); R. I. Gen. Laws. Tit.
45, ch. 24 § 22. See also Md. Ann. Code, Health-General Article, § 7-102.
11
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might be perceived to disadvantage them. The Education of
the Handicapped Act, for example, requires an "appropriate"
education, not one that is equal in all respects to the education of non-retarded children; clearly, admission to a class
that exceeded the abilities of a retarded child would not be
appropriate. 12 Similarly, the Developmental Disabilities Act
and the Texas act give the retarded the right to live only in
the "least restrictive setting" appropriate to their abilities,
implicitly assuming the need for at least some restrictions
that would not be imposed on others. 13 Especially given the
wide variation in the abilities and needs of the retarded themselves, governmental bodies must have a certain amount of
flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and
limiting their remedial efforts.
Third, the legislative response, which could hardly have occurred and survived without public support, negates any
claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless in
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of
the lawmakers. Any minority can be said to be powerless to
assert direct control over the legislature, but if that were a
criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts, much economic and social legislation would now be suspect.
Fourth, if the large and amorphous class of the mentally
retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by
the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled
way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who
cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses,
and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part
12

The Act, which specifically included the mentally retarded in its definition of handicapped, see 20 U. S. C. § 1401(1), also recognizes the great
variations within the classification of retarded children. The Act requires
that school authorities devise an "individualized eduational program," id.,
at § 1401(19), that is "tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped
child." Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 181 (1982).
18
The Developmental Disabilities Act also prohibits the use of physical
restraint "unless absolutely necessary." 42 U. S. C. § 6010(2).
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of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only
the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We
are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do
so.
Doubtless, there have been and there will continue to be
instances of discrimination against the retarded that are in
fact invidious, and that are properly subject to judicial correction under constitutional norms. But the appropriate
method of reaching such instances is not to create a new
quasi-suspect classification and subject all governmental action based on that classification to more searching evaluation.
Rather, we should look to the likelihood that governmental
action premised on a particular classification is valid as a general matter, not merely to the specifics of the case before us.
Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the government may legitimately take into account in a wide range
of decisions, and because both state and federal governments
have recently committed themselves to assisting· the retarded, we will not presume that any given legislative action,
even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in
considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate.
IV

Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect
class does not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious
discrimination. To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and
others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. This standard, we believe, affords government the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed
to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to
freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the retarded in what is essentially an incidental manner. The
State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an
asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55,
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61-63; United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U. S. 528, 535 (1973). Furthermore, some objectivessuch as "a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group," Moreno, 413 U. S., at 534--are not legitimate state
interests. See also Zobel, supra, 457 U. S., at 63. Beyond
that, the mentally retarded, like others, have and retain their
substantive constitutional rights in addition to the right to be
treated equally by the law. Our decision today in no way affects those rights.
The Court of Appeals, having settled on an intermediate
level of scrutiny, did not attempt to assess the validity of the
City's actions under the rational relationship standard. The
application of the proper test is a task that we leave to the
Court of Appeals in the first instance, particularly because
the question is one "clouded by an ambiguity in state law." 14
G. D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U. S. 404, 413 (1982). Cf.
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345-346 (1976); Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 524, and n. 2 (1972).
The case is accordingly reversed and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
14
The State of Texas and the State Deparment of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation (TDMHMR) have submitted a brief as amici curiae in
this Court, arguing that the city's denial of a special use permit runs
counter to the State's policy favoring the establishment of group homes for
the mentally retarded. See Mentally Retarded Persons Act of 1977, Tex.
Rev. Civ. art. 5547-300. Furthermore, the State asserts that the city
may not legitimately use its zoning powers to further the welfare of the
retarded themselves, as distinguished from the welfare of the surrounding
community. The State contends that judgments as to the ability of the
retarded to live in a group home in a residential neighborhood lie within the
exclusive province of the appropriate State agencies, and are not included
within the purposes that have been delegated to the city as valid objectives
of municipal zoning legislation. Brief for the State of Texas and the
TDMHMR as Amici Curiae 13-14. The State did not raise these arguments below, Tr. of Oral Arg. 30 (March 18, 1985), and we decline to address them or assess their significance.
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proper standard. This also was the Confence vote, and the present
draft follows that course. I much prefer it. '
Even if the validity of the ordinance is to be decided here,
see no persuasive reason for not announcing that rationality is
That is the issue we took this case to
[ the governing standard.
decide, there is a clear majority for that standard, and not
saying so will leave in place an erroneous Fifth Circuit
precedent that will govern the District Courts in that Circuit.
I doubt that we would have granted this case had it involved only
whether the rational basis standard had been properly applied;
yet confining our decision to the rationality of the zoning law
indicates a contrary result.
I

On the issue of validity, you assert that the ordinance is
invalid on its face and pay no attention to the as-applied issue,
which you say is before us.
But I had thought that a state law
is not facially invalid unless it is unconti tutional in all of
its reasonably possible appiTcations.
TO" put- it the other way,
if~Cm€~ore acceptable applications, it cannot be
facially invalid.
This means to me that the as-applied issue
should be decided first and the proffered grounds for sustaining
the ord1n
1
1s context either accepted or rejected.
If
accepted, the ordinance is neither invalid as applied or on its
face.
If rejected, the ordinance is invalid as apQlied, and
there is no neea to strike it down - ent1rely. As I have said, the
as-a~--wo~beSE-addresssed by the lower courts in
{. the first instance.

You suggest that the ordinance is facially infirm because
no reasons
are given for classifying,
for
special permit
purposes, the mentally retarded with the insane, alcoholics, and
drug addicts.
But this issue is not how alike or different from
those groups the mentally retarded are but whether they can
constitutionally be required to have a housing permit when
others, such as sanatoriums and nursing homes for the aged, need
not do so.
In view of the fact that mental retardation covers a
wide spectrum in terms of the degree of disability involved, I
find it difficult to believe that the special permit r~~JJement
would be invaljd with respect to eacn--·-a:na--e-ve·ry group of the
meri'1:aTIY..___r~e-ta.rded,
regardless
of
the
degree
of
their
retardation.
It may be that in light of the character is tics of
the group involved in this case and in light of the city's
proffered
justifications,
the
special
permit
cannot
constitutionally be denied.
But this would not be a facial
invalidity holding.
I should say that if the Court is not to announce the proper
standard of review, the case should be reassigned.
If the
opinion deals with that issue, I perhaps can accommodate myself
to the majority's desires as to whether to reach the validity
issue, as well as to either result that the majority might reach
on that question.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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To:
Justice Powell
From: Annmarie
Re:
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Here is a

a response

White's letter:
)~~~,

of the
ordinance is fai
against the ment
for the mentally
for other groups
to obtain such p
classification!. tQ~~~~~~~~~ee~~~~&±~~~res-~~~~en
~ .Qo. ~.
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of retardation, he statute does not account for such differences ,
- ~·
It subJects all the mentally retarded to the same
~ burden. Thus, while one can conceive of an ordinance th~ ~· ~
rationally subjected certain subclasses of the reta~~to
special requirements, that is not this ordinance. ~he City has
failed to offer any rational basis for treating all the mentally
retarded one way, and all residents of nursing homes,
fraternities, etc., differently.
The classification of the
mentally retarded with the insane, drug addicts, and alcoholics
suggests that prejudice, rather than reason, informed the City's
treatment of the mentally retarded ~uRder the ordiftance. For
these reasons, I thin-k we- ~ho~d holo ~ ordinance invalid on
its face.
It
-~~ h ~ftu....
I ~would go along, however, with a holding that
ordinance was invalid as applied in this case. The DC found
specifically that if the residents of the home were not mentally
retarded, but the home were the same in all other respects, the
use would have been permitted. CAS reached the same conclusion.
Moreover, the City offered no justification for denying a permit
to the particular residents of the home. Thus, even if we assume
that the City c~~~¥9 a ratjo~al basis for requiring group
homes for some kinds of entally retarded to obtain a special
permit, there is nothin in the record supporting the denial of
the permit to the part' ular individuals involved in this case •
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JUSTICE: SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 6, 1985

Re:

84-468

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center

Dear Byron,
I will still be with you if you decide the
statute is facially invalid, as Lewis suggests, but
I also agree with Bill Rehnquist that we should
decide the quasi-suspect class issue in any event.
Sincerely,

Justice White
Copies to:

Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist

June 7, 1985
84-468 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center

Dear Byron:
Thi.s is in reoly to your letter of the 6th.
I enclose copies of my longhann notes prepared
prior to our Conference. My view was that the "ordinance on
its face [is] invalid under the rational basis standard." I
also enclos~ my Conference notes that are a bit conc1usor.y.
I recorded an alternative vote:
"Remand to CA (or could
affirm on rational basis)". I also note~ my view that the
"ordinance flunks rational basis test on its face". l can
understand, ho\o~ever, that my sta temf.!'nt at Conference \'Tas
unclear as to my preference.

In 'l!Y letter of .June 5, I expreserJ the view that if
we held the ordinance facially invalid it would be unnecessary to consider th~ quasi-susoe~t cla~s queqtinn. ~h~re is
a good deal to your point, ho\1C\7P.r, that the question is
here and needq rP.Rolving. I would ~e willing to join an
opinion holding t~~t onlv the rational basis standard i~
applic~ble.

Finally, vou suqgest that perhaps it would be inappropriate to make a -FaciAl :invali..:"!itv hoJ··Hn('!. I am still
inclined to think, in view of the recor~ hefore us, that
such a holrlinq wouln be entirelv aonronri.ate. The or( i.nance
certainly c1iscriminatPs against the mentally retar(~e,.-1 in
that it requires a sPecial perrnit to mnintain a group home
for m~ntally retRr~ed rPsi~ents. The or~inanc~ n19o makes
the irrational distinction (as I view it) beh1een all mentally retarr!ed persons and residents of other tvpes of homes
permitted in this district, as well as treatfnq the retarded
as if they invariably were falrly comparable to the insane,
drug addicts and alcoholics. I find nothing in the record
that suggests a legitimate state interest for this discriminatory treatment.
Thus my preference continues to be to hold the
ordinance facially invalid. I would join four to make a
Court, however, in a holdina that the ordinance was invalid
as applie~ in this case as it flunks the rational basis
standard.
In view of the last paragraph in your letter, I
take it that our views can be reconciled.
Sincerely,
Justice t"'hite
lfp/ss
cc: The Conference

-~----------------~-~--------,.,___..

CHAMBERS O F

JUSTICE WM . J . 6RENNAN, JR.

J une 10, 1985

No. 845-468
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center

Dear Lewis,
I have read your correspondence
with
Byron.
Is
not
my
impression
correct that, if you adhere to your view
that the ordinance is facially invalid,
there
is a Court for
that holding
although perhaps on varying grounds?
Sincerel) ,

Jd-u (
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

June 10 , 1985

84-468 City of Cleburne v . Cleburne Living Center

Dear Bill:

In rnv tec~nt l~tter to Byron, T said th,t although
nreferf'nc-= ~~,a~ to ~oJC! the orrHn~nce far:t~llv invalid on
ration~l ha~is analvo:;i~, I '.vou11 cnnc;ider ioininq an Ol?inion
that invali~ated t~~ or~1n~nce a~ ary~lie~ .

my

I also now agree that we shoul0 der.:ine explicitly
that rational ~asis t~ the proper ~tan~ard . This will be

the prPcedent

t~at

counts .
Sincerely,

Just ice Bn:mnan

lfp/ss
cc : The Conference
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JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 10, 1985

84-468 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center

Dear Lewis,
In response to your letter of June 7 and
following our conversation of today,
make a

try at

invalidating the ordinance on

an as-applied basis.

You

indicate that you

could join if there were four others

______.

approach.

I shall

We shall see if it flies.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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o: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackrnun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

/
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Justice White

Circulated:--------Recirculated: _JU_N_l-'-1_19_85_ __

3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-468 ·

.
CITY OF CLEBURNE, TEXAS,-ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June - , 1985]

. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
A Texas city denied a special use permit for the operation
of a group home for the mentally retarded, acting pursuant to
a municipal zoning ordinance requiring permits for such
homes. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
mental retardation is a "quasi-suspect" classification and that
the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
did not substantially further an important governmental
purpose. We hold that a lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate, but conclude that under that standard the ordinance is invalid as applied in this case.

f•
I

I
In July, 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building
at 201 Featherston Street in the city of Cleburne, Texas,
with the intention of leasing it to Cleburne Living Centers,
Inc. (CLC), 1 for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. It was anticipated that the home would
house 13 retarded men and women, who would be under the
constant supervision of CLC staff members. The house had
'Cleburne Living Centers, Inc., is' now known as Community Living
Concepts, Inc. Hannah is the Vice-President and part owner of CLC.
For convenience, both Hannah and CLC will be referred to as "CLC." A
third respondent is Advocacy, Inc., a non-profit corporation that provides
legal services to developmentally disabled persons.
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four bedrooms and two baths, with a half bath to be added.
CLC planned to comply with all applicable state and federal
regulations. 2
The city informed CLC that a special use permit would be
required for the operation of a group home at the site, and
CLC accordingly submitted a permit application. In response to a subsequent inquiry from CLC, the city explained
that under the zoning regulations applicabl~ to the site, a special use permit, renewable annually, was required for the
construction of "[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded,
or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, o:r penal or correctional institutions." 3 The city had determined that the proposed
1

It was anticipated that the home would be operated as a private Level
I Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded, or ICF-MR,
under a program providing for joint federal-State reimbursement for residential services for mentally retarded clients.
See 42 U. S. C.
§ 1396d(a)(15); Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 32.001 et seq. ICF-MR's are covered by extensive regulations and guidelines established by the United
States Department of Health and Human Services and the Texas Departments of Human Resources, Mental Health and Mental Retardation, and
Health. See App. 92. See also 42 CFR § 442 et seq.; 25 Tex. Adm. Code,
Title 40, § 27 et seq.
1
The site of the home is in an area zoned "R-3," an "Apartment House
District." App. 51. Section 8 of the Cleburne zoning ordinance, in pertinent part, allows the following uses in an R-3 district:
"1. Any use permitted in District R-2.
"2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings.
"3. Boarding and lodging houses.
"4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories.
"5. Apartment hotels.
"6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing hom~ or homes for convalescents or
aged, otMr than for the insane or feeb~-minded or alcoholics or drug
addicts."
"7. Private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is
carried on as a business.
"8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other than penal
institutions.
"9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses . . ."
App. 60-61 (emphasis added).

I

j
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group home should be classified as a ''hospital for the feebleminded." After holding a public hearing on CLC's application, the city council voted three to one to deny a special use
permit. 4
CLC then filed suit in Federal District Court against the
city and a number of its officials, alleging, inter alia, that the
zoning ordinance was invalid on its face and as applied because it discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the equal protection rights of CLC and its potential
residents. The District CoUJ1; found that "[i]f .the potential
residents of the Featherston Street home were not mentally
retarded, but the home was the same in all other respects, its
use would be permitted under the city's zoning ordinance,"
and that the city council's decision "was motivated primarily
by the fact that the residents of the home would be persons
who are mentally retarded." App. at 93, 94. Even so, the
District Court held the ordinance and its application constitutional. Concluding that no fundamental right was implicated
and that mental retardation was neither a suspect nor a
quasi-suspect classification, the court employed the minimum
level of judicial scrutiny applicable to equal protection claims.
The court deemed the ordinance, as written and applied, to
be rationally related to the City's legitimate interests in "the
legal responsibility of CLC and its residents, . . . the safety
and fears of residents in the adjoining neighborhood," and the
Section 16 of the ordinance specifies the uses for which a special use permit is required. These include "[h]ospitals for the insane or feebleminded, or alcoholic or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions."
App. 63. Section 16 provides that a permit for such a use may be issued by
"the Governing Body, after public hearing, and after recommendation of
the Planning Commission." All special use permits are limited to one
year, and each applicant is required "to obtain the signatures of the property owners within two hundred (200) feet of the property to be used."
Ibid.
4
The City's Planning and Zoning Commission had earlier held a hearing
and voted to deny the permit. App. 91.
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number of people to be housed in the home. 5 !d., at 105.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, determining that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification and that it should assess the validity of the ordinance
under intermediate-level scrutiny. 726 F. 2d 191 (1984).
Because mental retardation was in fact relevant to many legislative actions, strict scrutiny was not appropriate. But in
light of the history of ''unfair and often ~tesque mistreatment" of the retarded, discrimination ag;rlnst them was
''likely to reflect deep-seated.prejudice." !d., at 197. In addition, the mentally retarded lacked. political power, and their
condition was immutable. The court considered heightened
scrutiny to be particularly appropriate in this case, because
the City's ordinance withheld a benefit which, although not
fundamental, was very important to the mentally retarded.
Without group homes, the court stated, the retarded could
never hope to integrate themselves into the community. 6
Applying the test that it considered appropriate, the court
held that the ordinance was invalid on its face because it did
not substantially further any important governmental interests. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the ordinance was also invalid as applied. 7 Rehearing en bane was
'The District Court also rejected CLC's other claims, including the argument that the City had violated due process by improperly delegating its
zoning powers to the owners of adjoining property. Cf. State ofWashin.gton ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116 (1928). App.
105. The Court of Appeals did not address this argument, and it has not
been raised by the parties in this Court.
• The District Court had found that
"[g]roup homes currently are the principal community living alternatives
for persons who are mentally retarded. The availability of such a home in
communities is an essential ingredient of normal living patterns for persons
who are mentally retarded, and each factor that makes such group homes
harder to establish operates to exclude persons who are mentally retarded
from the community." App. 94.
1
The City relied on a recently passed State regulation limiting group
homes to six residents in support of its argument that the CLC home would
be overcrowded with thirteen. But, the Court of Appeals observed, the
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denied with six judges dissenting in an opinion urging en
bane consideration of the panel's adoption of a heightened
standard of review. We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - (1984).8
II
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which
is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. ~- 202, 216
City had failed to justify its apparent view that any other group of thirteen
people could live under these allegedly "crowded" conditions, nor had it explained why six would be acceptable but thirteen not.
CLC concedes that it could not qualify for certification under the new
Texas regulation. Tr. Oral Arg. 31 (April 23, 1985). The Court of Appeals stated that the new regulation applied only to applications made after
May 1, 1982, and therefore did not apply to the CLC home. 726 F. 2d, at
202. The regulation itself contains no grandfather clause, see App. 78-81,
and the District Court made no specific finding on this point. See App. 96.
However, the State has asserted in an amicus brief filed in this Court that
"'the six bed rule' would not pose an obstacle to the proposed Featherston
Street group home at issue in this case." Brief for the State of Texas and
the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation as Amici
Curiae 15, n. 7. If the six-bed requirement were to apply to the home,
there is a serious possibility that CLC would no longer be interested in injunctive relief. David Southern, an officer of CLC, testifed that "to break
even on a facility of this type, you have to have at least ten or eleven residents." App. 32. However, because CLC requested damages as well as
an injunction, see App. 15, the case would not be moot.
1
Macon Association for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County
Planning and Zoning CommiBBBion, 314 S. E. 2d 218 (Ga.), dismissed for

want of a substantial federal question,- U. S. - - (1984), has no controlling effect on this case. Macon Association/or Retarded Citizens involved an ordinance that had the effect of excluding a group home for the
retarded only because it restricted dwelling units to those occupied by a
single family, defined as no more than four unrelated persons. In Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 (1974), we upheld the constitutionality
of a similar ordinance, and the Georgia Supreme Court in Macon Association specifically held that the ordinance did not discriminate against the retarded. 314 S. E. 2d, at 221.

·.'
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(1982). Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to
enforce this mandate, but absent controlling Congressional
direction, the Courts have themselves devised standards for
determining the validity of state legislation or other offical
action that is challenged as denying equal protection. The
general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate sta e · er st. Schweiker
v. Wi son, 50 . . 221,
(1981); ·United States Railroad
Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174-)75 (1980);
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976). When social or economic
legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the
states wide latitude, United States Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz, supra, at 174 (1980); New Orleans v. Dukes,
supra, at 303, and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.
The g neral e ·v w , ho
te classifies by race alie
e or nati nal ori · . These factors are
so seldom relevant to e ac ·evement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those
in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. For these reasons and because such discrimination is
unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws
are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if
they are suitably tailored to a serve a compelling state
intersts. McLaughlin v. Florida,-·379 U. S. 184, 192 (1964);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971). Similar oversight by the courts is due when state laws impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution. Kramer v.
Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U. S. 621 (1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 u. s. 535 (1942).

I
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Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a
heightened standard of review. That factor generally provides no sensible ground for differential treatment. "[W]hat
differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability . . . is that the sex characteristic
frequently bears no relationship to ability to perform or contribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677,
686 (1973) (plurality opinion). Rather than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect
outmoded notions of the relative .capabilities ·of men and
women. A gender classification fails unless it is substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S.
718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1971). Because
illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control and bears "no
relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society," Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 505
(1976), official discriminations resting on that characteristic
are also subject to somewhat heightened review. Those restrictions ''will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent that they are substantially related to a legitimate state
interest." Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U. S. 91, 99 (1982).
We have declined, however, to extend heightened review
to differential treatment based on age:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not
been wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike,
say, those who have been discriminated against on the
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a
''history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of~eir
ilities.
Massachusetts Board of Retirement . Mu
, 427
u. s. 307' 313 (1976).
The lesson of Murgia is that where individuals in the group
affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant

.

J
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to interests the state has the authority to implement, the
courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether,
how and to what extent those interests should be pursued.
In such cases, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a
rational means to serve a legitimate end.

III
Against this background, we conclude for several reasons
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding mental retardation
a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting
standard of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social legislation. First, it is undeniable, and it is
not argued otherwise here, that those who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the
everyday world. Nor are they all cut from the same pattern:
as the testimony in this record indicates, they range from
those whose disability is not immediately evident to those
who must be constantly cared for.• They are thus different,

I

I
1

l

t

• Mentally retarded individuals fall into four distinct categories. The
vast majority-approximately ~ classified as "mildly" retarded,
meaning that their IQ is between 50 and 70. Approximately 6% percent
are "moderately" retarded, with IQs between 35 and 50. The remaining
two categories are "severe" (IQs of 20 to 35) and "profound" (IQs below
20). These last two categories together account for about 5% of the mentally retarded population. App. 39 (testimony of Dr. Philip Roos).
Mental retardation is not defined by reference to intelligence or IQ
alone, however. The American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD)
has defined mental retardation as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior
and manifested during the developmental period." Brief for AAMD et al.
as Amici Curiae 3 (quoting AAMD, Classification in Mental Retardation 1
(H. Grossman ed. 1983)). "Deficits in adaptive behavior" are limitations
on general ability to meet the standards of maturation, learning, personal
independence, and social responsibility expected for an individual's age
level and cultural group. ld., at 4, n. 1. Mental retardation is caused by
a variety of factors, some genetic, some environmental, and some unknown. ld., at 4.

I
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immutably so, in relevant respects, and the states' interest in
dealing with and providing for them is plainly a legitmate
one. 10 How this large and diversified group is to be treated
under the law is a difficult and often a technical matter, very
much a task for legislators guided by qualified professionals
and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary.
Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive judgments about legislative decisions, and we doubt that the
predicate for such judicial oversight is present where the
classification deals with mental retardation.
Second, the distinctive legislative response, both national
and state, to the plight of those who are mentally retarded
demonstrates not only that they have unique problems, but
also that the lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight
by the judiciary. Thus, the federal government has not only
outlawed discrimination against the mentally retarded in federally funded programs, see § 504 of the Rehabilitation Ac of
1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, but it has also provided the retarded
with the right to receive "appropriate treatment, services,
and habilitation" in a setting that is "least restrictive of
[their] personal liberty." Developmental Disabilities and
Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S.C. §6010(1), (2). In addition,
the government has conditioned federal education funds on a
State's assurance that retarded children will enjoy an educa18

As Dean Ely has observed:

"Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something he or she
can't do anything about, but I'm not aware of any reason to suppose that
elected officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling. Moreover,
classifications based on physical disability and intelligence are typically accepted as legitimate, even by judges and commentators who assert that immutability is relevant. The explanation, when one is given, is that those
characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is trying to render suspect) are often relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point there's not
much left of the immutability theory, is there?" J. Ely, Democracy and
Distrust 160 (1980) (footnote omitted). See also id., at 164-155.
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tion that, "to the maximum extent appropriate," is integrated
with that of non-mentally retarded children. Education of
the Handicapped Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1412(5)(B). The government has also facilitated the hiring of the mentally retarded
into the federal civil service by exempting them from the requirement of competitive examination.
See 5 CFR
§ 213-3102(t) (1984). The State of Texas has similarly enacted legislation that acknowledges the special status of the
mentally retarded by conferring certain rights upon them,
such as ''the right to live in the least restrictive setting appropriate to [their] individual need!) and abilities," including ''the
right to live ... in a group home." · Mentally Retarded Persons Act of 1977, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5547-300,
§7.11

Such legislation thus singling out the retarded for special
treatment reflects the real and undeniable differences between the retarded and others. That a civilized and decent
society expects and approves such legislation indicates that
governmental consideration of those differences in the vast
majority of situations is not only legitimate but desirable. It
may be, as CLC contends, that legislation designed to benefit, rather than disadvantage, the retarded would generally
withstand examination under, a test of heightened scrutiny.
See Brief for Respondents 38-41. The relevant inquiry,
however, is whether heightened scrutiny is constitutionally
mandated in the first instance. Even assuming that many of
these laws could be shown to be substantially related to an
important governmental purpose, merely requiring the legislature to justify its efforts in these tenns may lead it to re11

CLC originally sought relief under the-Act, but voluntarily dismissed
this pendent state claim when the District Court indicated that its presence
might make abstention appropriate. The Act had never been construed
by the Texas courts. App. 12, 14, 84-87.
A number of states have passed legislation prohibiting zoning that excludes the retarded. See, e. g., Cal. Health & Saf. Code §1566 et seq.;
Conn. Gen Stat. § 8-3e; N. D. C. C. § 25-16-14(2); R. I. Gen. Laws. Tit.
45, eh. 24 § 22. See also Md. Ann. Code, Health-General Article, § 7-102.

j
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frain from acting at all. Much recent legislation intended to
benefit the retarded also assumes the need for measures that
might be perceived to disadvantage them. The Education of
the Handicapped Act, for example, requires an "appropriate"
education, not one that is equal in all respects to the education of non-retarded children; clearly, admission to a class
that exceeded the abilities of a retarded child would not be
appropriate. 12 Similarly, the Developmental Disabilities Act
and the Texas act give the retardeq the right to live only in
the ''least restrictive setting" appropriate to their abilities,
implicitly assuming the need· for ~t least some ·restrictions
that would not be imposed on others. 13 Especially given the
wide variation in the abilities and needs of the retarded themselves, governmental bodies must have a certain amount of
flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and
limiting their remedial efforts.
Third, the legislative response, which could hardly have occurred and survived without public support, negates any
claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless in
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of
the lawmakers. Any minority can be said to be powerless to
assert direct control over the legislature, but if that were a
criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts, much economic and social legislation would now be suspect.
Fourth, if the large and amorphous class of the mentally
retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by
the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled
way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have per11

\

t

i

1

The Act, which specifically included the mentally retarded in its definition of handicapped, see 20 U. S. C. §1401(1), also recognizes the great
variations within the classification of retarded children. The Act requires
that school authorities devise an "individualized eduational program," id. ,
at § 1401(19), that is "tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped
child." Board of Education v. R(1Wley, 458 U. S. 176, 181 (1982).
11
The Developmental Disabilities Act also withholds public funds from
any program that does not prohibit the use of physical restraint "unless absolutely necessary." 42 U.S. C. §6010(2).
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haps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who
cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses,
and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part
of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only
the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We
are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do
so.
Doubtless, there have been and there ~ll continue to be
instances of discrimination against the retarded that are in
fact invidious, and that are· properly subject to judicial correction under constitutional ·norms. But the 'llppropriate
method of reaching such instances is not to create a new
quasi-suspect classification and subject all governmental action based on that classification to more searching evaluation.
Rather, we should look to the likelihood that governmental
action premised on a particular classification is valid as a general matter, not merely to the specifics of the case before us.
Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the government may legitimately take into account in a wide range
of decisions, and because both state and federal governments
have recently committed themselves to assisting the retarded, we will not presume that any given legislative· action,
even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in
considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate.
Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect
class does not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious
discrimination. To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and
others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. This standard, we believe, affords government the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed
to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to
freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the retarded in what is essentially an incidental manner. The
State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an
asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction ar-
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bitrary or irrational. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55,
61-63; United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U. S. 528, 535 (1973). Furthennore, some objectivessuch as "a bare . . . desire to hann a politically unpopular
group," Moreno, 413 U. S., at 534-are not legitimate state
interests. See also Zobel, supra, 457 U. S., at 63. Beyond
that, the mentally retarded, like others, have and retain their
substantive constitutional rights in addition to the right to be
treated equally by the law.
IV

We turn to the issue of the validity of the zoning ordinance
insofar as it requires a special use permit !Qr homes for the
mentally retarded. 14 We mqui:i=e!U=Stwhetherdenymg a
speCiil use permit for the Featherston lJ.Q..rne in the circumstances here deprives responaents of the equal protection of
the laws. If it does, there will be no occasion to decide } ~ ~
w ther the s ecial use ermit rovision ~alid \ ..,4 d""-<- ....t.
where the men y re
e are tpvolve ' or 0 pu 1 an~
~ ~
other way, whether the cit
ne've · ist n a s cial use 1
tJ ____..
permit for a home for e mentall r
zone. This ts e pre e!Ted course o adjudication since it enables
courts to avoid making uru:tecessarily broad constitutional
judgments. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,-- U.S.--,
(1985); United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171 (1983);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963).
The constitutional issue is clearly posed. The City does
not require a special use permit in an R-3 zone for apartment
houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or sorority houses, do~tories, apartment hotels,
hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or
the aged (other than for .the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug addicts), private clubs or fraternal orders, and

r __, /.

u It goes without saying that there is nothing before us with respect to
the validity of requiring a special use pennit for the other uses listed in the
ordinance. Seen. 3, I'Upra.
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other specified uses. It does, however, insist on a special
pennit for the Featherstonnorne, and it does so, as the District oUrt oun , because it would be a facility for the mentally retarded.
May the city denythe permit to this facility
when other care and multiple dwelling facilities are freely
pennitted?
It is true, as already pointed out, that the mentally retarded as a group are indeed different from others not sharing their misfortune, and in this respect they may be different from those who would occupy other facilities that would
be pennitted in an R-3 zone without a special pennit. But
this difference · ~el irrelevant
ess the Featherston
horne and t ose who woul occupy it wo
eaten
•timafe interests of t e cit in a wa that other nnitted uses
sue as boarding hous s d hos "tals w d not. ~ in
· or beour VIew the reco d s not reveal an rat·
lievin that the Feath.erston h.orne would se any s cial
threat to the city's egttlrnate mterests, we affirm the JUdgme nt below insofar as it holds the ordinance invalid as applied
~e.

<:e.

---...,__...,

____...._,_.___

'

The District Court found that the City Council's denial of
the pennit rested on sever.al factors. First, the Council was
concerned with the negative ,attitude of the majority of property owners located within 200 feet of the Featherston facility, as well as with the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood. But mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning
proceeding, is not a permissible basis for treating a horne for
the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses,
multiple dwellings, and the like. --It is plain that the electorate as a whole, whether by referendum or or otherwise, could
not order city action violative of the Equal Protection clause,
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377
U. S. 713, 736-737 (1964), and the City may not avoid the
strictures of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the body politic. "Private biases

I

·-

~-

,

~?

.

~....
41-

Lc.J

~
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may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." Palmore v. Sidoti,

-

u. s. - , -

(1984).

Second, the Council had two objections to the location of
the facility. It was concerned that the facility was across the
street from a junior high school, and it feared that the students might harass the occupants of the Featherston home.
But the school itself is attended b about 30 mentall retarded stu_ents, and enymg a perrrut base on such vague,
una iffereiitiated fears is again perm1tting some portion of the
community to validate what would otherwise be· an equal protection violation. The other objection to the home's location
was that it was located on a ve hundred year flood plain."
This concern with the possibility of a flood, however, can
hardly be based on a distinction between the Featherston
home and, for example, nursing homes, homes for convalescents or the aged, or sanitariums or hospitals, any of which
could be located on the Featherston site without obtaining a
special use permit. The same may be said of another concern of the Council-doubts about the legal responsibility for
actions which the mentally retarded might take. If there is
no concern about legal responsibility with respect to other
uses that would be permitted in the area, such as boarding
and fraternity houses, it is difficult to believe that the groups
of mildly or moderately mentally retarded individuals who
would live at 201 Featherston would present any different or
special hazard.
Fourth, the Council was concerned with the size of the
home and the number of people that would occupy it. The
District Court found, and the Court of Appeals repeated,
that ''if the potential residents of the Featherston Street
home were not mentally retarded, but the home was the
same in all other respects, its use would be permitted under
the city's zoning ordinance." ·· App. 93; 726 F. 2d, at 200.
Give~ing, there would be no restrictions on the number of people who could occupy t · orne as a oar ing
~

}/J

<:_
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house, nursing horne, family dwelling, fraternity house, or
dormitory. The question is whether it is rational to treat the
mentally retarded differently. It is true that they suffer disability not shared by others; but why this difference warrants
a density regulation that others need not observe is not at all
apparent. At least this record does not clarify how, in this
connection, the characteristics of the intended occupants of
the Featherston home rationally ;justifies denying to those occupants what would be permitted to groups occupying the
same site for different purposes. Those who would live in
the Featherston home are t~ht of individual~ who, with
supporting staff, satisfy fede ai state standards for group
housing in the community; an
ere is no dispute that the
home would meet the federal square-footage-per-resident requirement for facilities of this type. See 42 CFR § ~447
(1984). In the words of the Court of Appeals, "The City )
never justifies its apparent view that other people can live
under such 'crowded' conditions when mentally retarded persons cannot." 726 F. 2d, at 202.
In the courts below the city also urged that the ordinance is
aimed at avoiding concentration of population and at lessen.ing congestion of the streets. These concerns obviously fail
to explain why apartment houses, fraternity and sorority
houses, hospitals and the like, may freely locate iil the area
without a permit. So, too, the expressed worry about fire
hazards, the serenity of the neighborhood, and the avoidance
of danger to other residents fail rationally to justify singling
out a home such as 201 Featherston for the special use permit, yet imposing no such restrictions on the many other uses
..,
freely permitted in the neighborhood.
The s ort · is that denial of the' l
pe:~--~~~~~~~~~~~~

tally retarded, me u mg t ose w o would occupy the
Featherston facility and who would live under the closely supervised and highly regulated conditions expressly provided
for by state and federal law.

84-468--0PINION
CLEBURNE v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER

.\

17

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar as
it invalidates the zoning ordinance as applied to the
Featherston home. The judgment is otherwise vacated.

It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 12, 1985

No. 84-468

City of Cleburne, Texas v.
Cleburne Living Center

Dear Byron,
I am still with you on this.
Sincerely,

Justice White

Copies to the Conference

•taU•

.Atuprmu <lf.mri &tf tJrt ~tb
._uJringhm. ~- <q. 2llp,.~
CHAMI!IERS 01'"

..JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 12, 1985
Re:

No. 84-468

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center

Dear Byron,
I agree with your third draft in this case.
Sincerely,

wwv

Justice White
cc:

The Conference

aml

6/13/85

To:
Justice Powell
From: Annmarie
Re:
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
No. 84-468
I am a bit confused by Justice White's third draft in this
case, although I think much of the new section, Part IV, is quite
good. There are three poss1 e 1nterpretations o-f t he Court •'s
fiOl ding: (1) the ordinance is invalid as applied insofar as it
requires this group home to obtain a special use permit: (2) the
ordinance is invalid as applied insofar as the City denied this
group home a special use permit: (3) the ordinance is invalid on
its face because there is no rational basis for requiring group
homes for the mentally retarded to obtain a special permit. From
the correspondence and the opening paragraph of part IV, it is
clear that Justice White thinks of the third possibility as a
"facial challenge" and does not intend it to be the holding.
Nevertheless, I think the reasoning of his opinion supports that
{ holding more clearly than either of the two alternatives.

7

l

The opinion ~ ns by stating that the Court will decide only
whether the denial of the permit to this home was a denial of
equal protection.
It e !Eli~~ states that t he Cour t will not
decide _whether the city m y neve ?-re qur re a permit for tfie--men tar"".lY
~~ ne.
e ana ysis on pages 14 - 16
the ~e als Wi th ~ c onsiderations that seemingly have little to do
with the denial of the permit to this home, or the permit
requirement as applied to this home, but rather entail the
legitimacy of the permit requirement for all homes for mentally
retarded, but not for other R-3 uses. Throughout the section,
Justice White compares the mentally retarded to other groups who
do not need a permit at all in an R-3 zone and finds no rational
basis for treating them differently. He does not rely on the
particular characteristics of the occupants of this home, but
rather analyzes the classification generally.
So, for example,
he quite
o er y notes t at t er 1s no reason to think that the
500-year flood plain, population density, or traffic concerns ar
relevant to homes for the mentally retarded, but not to nursing
homes, fraternities, boarding houses, etc. Thus, I think Justic
White's analysis logically supports the view that there is no
rational basis for the permit requirement itself.
Alternatively, one could interpret the opinion as saying that
there is no rational basis for requiring this group home to get a

permit. But the opinion doesn't discuss the characteristics of
this particular home.
Despite this, Justice White fj e ~en!l~ ~~ates that the
·
'o al wrong in this case is ~ he d ~o i ~h e permit,
erm1t re ui ement. There may be at least one practical
problem witn the use of this language: under the Cleburne scheme,
permits must be renewed annually. Why should this home have to
renew its permit every year if it is not different in any
relevant respect f~om fraternities, nursing homes, etc., which
need not get permits at all? It may be that a foot~ te c ould
take care of this roblem. Such a no te cou ra- state that absent
change c1r urns ances (i. e., changes in the character of the
home's residents or the permit scheme generally), renewals may
not be denied to this home. Once a home obtains a permit, the
presumption that it is different from uses that do not need an
initial permit disappears and renewals should be automatic in the
absence of relevant changes.
Finally, the opinion does
ordinance lumps the mentally
alcoholics, and the insaoe.
( this classification suggests
the legislative scheme.

not mention that the Cleburne
retarded with drug addicts,
As you have pointed out repeatedly,
irrational prejudice at the heart of

I'm not sure what to recommend at this point. Much of Justice
White's reasoning is quite good and supports your position for a
"facial" challenge better than it supports his position for an
"as applied" challenge. The opinion is not as logical as it
could be, because of Justice White's insistence on a somewhat
artificial distinction between facial and as applied challenges.
Still, he has changed the opinion to decide the constitutional
question and a footnote on annual r ewals rna take care of the
only practical proble w1 h h1s approach.

an!

6/14/85

To:
Justice Powell
From: Annmarie
Re:
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
Supplemental memo
Upon further reflection, I'm not sure that the problems in
Justice White's opinion can be solved by adding a footnote on
annual renewals. The respP.nreally complain of two different
actions by the City -- ~~ equirement that the y-9et a 2~ rmit in
the first place, and t ~denial of the perm i t. As I explained
earlier, Justice White's op [ ni on dOes not clearly di~ferentiate
these two things, blrr: I think Just ice~ e mea n s t ~ a idate
'?~
e d n
of the ermi t.
If1:1TtSTrue,
en his op1n1on
does not dispose o all of the issues in the case.
It is not
eno ugfi t~tnat ' the per~ · srro a ia n o t ~ ve been withheld from
resps when they contend that they should not be required to
obtain a permit.
I think it is possible to deal with the permit
requir~ on an "as appli~d" bas1s, an~s I ~dO n,..t t iilnR:- it
is"" necessariT y-'incons i stentw 1tFi ~ustice White's views to have
the Court resolve whetAer the City may require this group home to
obtain a permit •
1

. ..

June 15, 1985

84-468 Cleburne

Dear Byron:
I have read the thirll oraft: of your opin:ion a~
dressing the validity of the ordinance on an as-applied
basis. r agree with what you have written and - though I
continue to think the ordinance is facially invalld I will
make the fifth vote for your opinion if you clarify one
point that I think is important.
Mv understanding is that the respondents challenged the orc'Hnance as applied on two grounds: (i) the
requirement of a permit, ano (ii) the denial of the permit.
As I read your opinion, vou conclude that the denial of the
permit was irrational under eaual o~otection analysis. This
leaves unanswered whether the requirement for a special use
p~rmit tn this case itself violated the Equal Protection
Clause. As you note on p. 13, the R-3 zone permits a wide
varietv of uses, but. requires a special use pet"mit only for
the "insane or feeble minded or alcoholic or d rug addicts".
Nothinq in the record suooorts or i~entifies anv legitimate
city interest that justifies th5.s sing1 inq out of homes for
the mentally retarded or for treating them as invariably
comparable to homes for the insane, alcoholic~ and drug
addicts.
I believe that modest changes in vour opinion
could make clear that requiring respondents to obtain a special use permit, as well as denial of the permit, rests on
irrational prejudice a.gainst the mentally retarded.

Sincerely,

Justice White
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.. ·

.
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To: The Chief
. Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice White

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

4th DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-468

CITY OF CLEBURNE, TEXAS, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June .- , 1985]

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
A Texas city denied a special use permit for the operation
of a group home for the mentally retarded, acting pursuant to
a municipal zoning ordinance requiring permits for such
homes. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
mental retardation is a "quasi-suspect" classification and that
the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
did not substantially further an important governmental
purpose. We hold that a lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate, but conclude that under that standard the ordinance is invalid as applied in this case.
I
In July, 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building
at 201 Featherston Street in the city of Cleburne, Texas,
with the intention of leasing it to Cleburne Living Centers,
Inc. (CLC), 1 for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. It was anticipated that the home would
house 13 retarded men and women, who would be under the
constant supervision of CLC staff members. The house had
'Cleburne Living Centers, Inc., is now known as Community Living
Concepts, Inc. Hannah is the Vice-President and part owner of CLC.
For convenience, both Hannah and CLC will be referred to as "CLC." A
third respondent is Advocacy, Inc., a non-profit corporation that provides
· legal services to developmentally disabled persons.
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four bedrooms and two baths, with a half bath to be added.
CLC planned to comply with all applicable state and federal
regulations. 2
The city informed CLC that a special use permit would be
required for the operation of a group home at the site, and
CLC accordingly submitted a permit application. In response to a subsequent inquiry from CLC, the city explained
that under the zoning regulations applicable to the site, a special use permit, renewable annually, was required for the
construction of "[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded,
or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions." 3 The city had determined that the proposed
2
It was anticipated that the home would be operated as a private Level
I Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded, or ICF-MR,
under a program providing for joint federal-State reimbursement for residential services for mentally retarded clients.
See 42 U. S. C.
§ 1396d(a)(15); Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 32.001 et seq. ICF -MR's are covered by extensive regulations and guidelines established by the United
States Department of Health and Human Services and the Texas Departments of Human Resources, Mental Health and Mental Retardation, and
Health. See App. 92. See also 42 CFR § 442 et seq.; 25 Tex. Adm. Code,
Title 40, § 27 et seq.
3
The site of the home is in an area zoned "R-3," an "Apartment House
District." App. 51. Section 8 of the Cleburne zoning ordinance, in pertinent part, allows the following uses in an R-3 district:
"1. Any use permitted in District R-2.
"2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings.
"3. Boarding and lodging houses.
"4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories.
"5. Apartment hotels.
"6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes or homes for convalescents or
aged, other than for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug
addicts."
"7. Private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is
carried on as a business.
"8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other than penal
institutions.
"9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses . . ."
App. 60-61 (emphasis added).
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group home should be classified as a "hospital for the feebleminded." After holding a public hearing on CLC's application, the city council voted three to one to deny a special use
permit. 4
CLC then filed suit in Federal District Court against the
city and a number of its officials, alleging, inter alia, that the
zoning ordinance was invalid on its face and as applied because it discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the equal protection rights of CLC and its potential
residents. The District Court found that "[i]f the potential
residents of the Featherston Street home were not mentally
retarded, but the home was the same in all other respects, its
use would be permitted under the city's zoning ordinance,"
and that the city council's decision "was motivated primarily
by the fact that the residents of the home would be persons
who are mentally retarded." App. at 93, 94. Even so, the
District Court held the ordinance and its application constitutional. Concluding that no fundamental right was implicated
and that mental retardation was neither a suspect nor a
quasi-suspect classification, the court employed the minimum
level of judicial scrutiny applicable to equal protection claims.
The court deemed the ordinance, as written and applied, to
be rationally related to the City's legitimate interests in "the
legal responsibility of CLC and its residents, ... the safety
and fears of residents in the adjoining neighborhood," and the
Section 16 of the ordinance specifies the uses for which a special use permit is required. These include "[h]ospitals for the insane or feebleminded, or alcoholic or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions. "
App. 63. Section 16 provides that a permit for such a use may be issued by
"the Governing Body, after public hearing, and after recommendation of
the Planning Commission." All special use permits are limited to one
year, and each applicant is required "to obtain the signatures of the property owners within two hundred (200) feet of the property to be used."
Ibid.
• The City's Planning and Zoning Commission had earlier held a hearing
and voted to deny the permit. App. 91.

84-468--0PINION
4

CLEBURNE v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER

number of people to be housed in the home. 5 !d., at 105.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, determining that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification and that it should assess the validity of the ordinance
under intermediate-level scrutiny. 726 F. 2d 191 (1984).
Because mental retardation was in fact relevant to many legislative actions, strict scrutiny was not appropriate. But in
light of the history of "unfair and often grotesque mistreatment" of the retarded, discrimination against them was
"likely to reflect deep-seated prejudice." !d., at 197. In addition, the mentally retarded lacked political power, and their
condition was immutable. The court considered heightened
scrutiny to be particularly appropriate in this case, because
the City's ordinance withheld a benefit which, although not
fundamental, was very important to the mentally retarded.
Without group homes, the court stated, the retarded could
never hope to integrate themselves into the community. 6
Applying the test that it considered appropriate, the court
held that the ordinance was invalid on its face because it did
not substantially further any important governmental interests. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the ordinance was also invalid as applied. 7 Rehearing en bane was
' The District Court also rejected CLC's other claims, including the argument that the City had violated due process by improperly delegating its
zoning powers to the owners of adjoining property. Cf. State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116 (1928). App.
105. The Court of Appeals did not address this argument , and it has not
been raised by the parties in this Court.
6
The District Court had found that
"[g]roup homes currently are the principal community living alternatives
for persons who are mentally retarded. The availability of such a home in
communities is an essential ingredient of normal living patterns for persons
who are mentally retarded , and each factor that makes such group homes
harder to establish operates to exclude persons who are mentally retarded
from the community." App. 94.
7
The City relied on a recently passed State regulation limiting group
homes to six residents in support of its argument that the CLC home would
be overcrowded with thirteen. But, the Court of Appeals observed, the
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denied with six judges dissenting in an opinion urging en
bane consideration of the panel's adoption of a heightened
standard of review. We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - (1984). 8
II
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which
is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 216
City had failed to justify its apparent view that any other group of thirteen
people could live under these allegedly "crowded" conditions, nor had it explained why six would be acceptable but thirteen not.
CLC concedes that it could not qualify for certification under the new
Texas regulation. Tr. Oral Arg. 31 (April 23, 1985). The Court of Appeals stated that the new regulation applied only to applications made after
May 1, 1982, and therefore did not apply to the CLC home. 726 F. 2d, at
202. The regulation itself contains no grandfather clause, see App. 78-81,
and the District Court made no specific finding on this point. See App. 96.
However, the State has asserted in an amicus brief filed in this Court that
"'the six bed rule' would not pose an obstacle to the proposed Featherston
Street group home at issue in this case." ·Brief for the State of Texas and
the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation as Amici
Curiae 15, n. 7. If the six-bed requirement were to apply to the home,
there is a serious possibility that CLC would no longer be interested in injunctive relief. David Southern, an officer of CLC, testifed that "to break
even on a facility of this type, you have to have at least ten or eleven residents." App. 32. However, because CLC requested damages as well as
an injunction, see App. 15, the case would not be moot.
8
Macon A ssociation for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County
Planning and Zoning Commisssion, 314 S. E. 2d 218 (Ga.), dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question,-- U. S. - - (1984), has no controlling effect on this case. Macon Association for Retarded Citizens involved an ordinance that had the effect of excluding a group home for the
retarded only because it restricted dwelling units to those occupied by a
single family, defined as no more than four unrelated persons. In Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 (1974), we upheld the constitutionality
of a similar ordinance, and the Georgia Supreme Court in Macon Association specifically held that the ordinance did not discriminate against the retarded. 314 S. E . 2d, at 221.
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Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to
enforce this mandate, but absent controlling Congressional
direction, the Courts have themselves devised standards for
determining the validity of state legislation or other offical
action that is challenged as denying equal protection. The
general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Schweiker
v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 230 (1981); United States Railroad
Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174-175 (1980);
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976). When social or economic
legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the
states wide latitude, United States Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz, supra, at 174 (1980); New .Orleans v. Dukes,
supra, at 303, and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.
The general rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage or national origin. These factors are
so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those
in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. For these reasons and because such discrimination is
unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws
are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if
they are suitably tailored to a serve a compelling state
intersts. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 192 (1964);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971). Similar oversight by the courts is due when state laws impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution. Kramer v.
Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U. S. 621 (1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942).
(1982).
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Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a
heightened standard of review. That factor generally provides no sensible ground for differential treatment. "[W]hat
differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability . . . is that the sex characteristic
frequently bears no relationship to ability to perform or contribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677,
686 (1973) (plurality opinion). Rather than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect
outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and
women. A gender classification fails unless it is substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S.
718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1971). Because
illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control and bears "no
relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society," Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 505
(1976), official discriminations resting on that characteristic
are also subject to somewhat heightened review. Those restrictions "will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent that they are substantially related to a legitimate state
interest." Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U. S. 91, 99 (1982).
We have declined, however, to extend heightened review
to differential treatment based on age:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not
been wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike,
say, those who have been discriminated against on the
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
u. s. 307, 313 (1976).
The lesson of Murgia is that where individuals in the group
affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant
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to interests the state has the authority to implement, the
courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether,
how and to what extent those interests should be pursued.
In such cases, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a
rational means to serve a legitimate end.

III
Against this background, we conclude for several reasons
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding mental retardation
a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting
standard of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social legislation. First, it is undeniable, and it is
not argued otlierwise here, that those who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the
everyday world. Nor are they all cut from the same pattern:
as the testimony in this record indicates, they range from
those whose disability is not immediately evident to those
who must be constantly cared for. 9 They are thus different,
Mentally retarded individuals fall into four distinct categories. The
vast majority-approximately 89%-are classified as "mildly" retarded,
meaning that their IQ is between 50 and 70. Approximately 6% percent
are "moderately" retarded, with IQs between 35 and 50. The remaining
two categories are "severe" (IQs of 20 to 35) and "profound" (IQs below
20). These last two categories together account for about 5% of the mentally retarded population. App. 39 (testimony of Dr. Philip Roos).
Mental retardation is not defined by reference to intelligence or IQ
alone, however. The American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD)
has defined mental retardation as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior
and manifested during the developmental period." Brief for AAMD et al.
as Amici Curiae 3 (quoting AAMD, Classification in Mental Retardation 1
(H. Grossman ed. 1983)). "Deficits in adaptive behavior" are limitations
on general ability to meet the standards of maturation, learning, personal
independence, and social responsibility expected for an individual's age
level and cultural group. !d., at 4, n. 1. Mental retardation is caused by
a variety of factors, some genetic, some environmental, and some unknown. I d., at 4.
9
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immutably so, in relevant respects, and the states' interest in
dealing with and providing for them is plainly a legitmate
one. 10 How this large and diversified group is to be treated
under the law is a difficult and often a technical matter, very
much a task for legislators guided by qualified professionals
and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary.
Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive judgments about legislative decisions, and we doubt that the
predicate for such judicial oversight is present where the
classification deals with mental retardation.
Second, the distinctive legislative response, both national
and state, to the plight of those who are mentally retarded
demonstrates not only that they have unique problems, but
also that the lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight
by the judiciary. Thus, the federal government has not only
outlawed discrimination against the mentally retarded in federally funded programs, see § 504 of the Rehabilitation Ac of
1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, but it has also provided the retarded
with the right to receive "appropriate treatment, services,
and habilitation" in a setting that is "least restrictive of
[their] personal liberty." Developmental Disabilities and
Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6010(1), (2). In addition,
the government has conditioned federal education funds on a
State's assurance that retarded children will enjoy an educaAs Dean Ely has observed:
"Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something he or she
can't do anything about, but I'm not aware of any reason to suppose that
elected officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling. Moreover,
classifications based on physical disability and intelligence are typically accepted as legitimate, even by judges and commentators who assert that immutability is relevant. The explanation, when one is given, is that those
characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is trying to render suspect) are often relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point there's not
much left of the immutability theory, is there?" J. Ely, Democracy and
Distrust 150 (1980) (footnote omitted). See also id., at 154-155.
10
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tion that, "to the maximum extent appropriate," is integrated
with that of non-mentally retarded children. Education of
the Handicapped Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1412(5)(B). The government has also facilitated the hiring of the mentally retarded
into the federal civil service by exempting them from the requirement of competitive examination.
See 5 CFR
§ 213-3102(t) (1984). The State of Texas has similarly enacted legislation that acknowledges the special status of the
mentally retar~ed by conferring certain rights upon them,
such as "the right to live in the least restrictive setting appropriate to [their] individual needs and abilities," including "the
right to live . . . in a group home." Mentally Retarded Persons Act of 1977, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 5547-300,
§ 7.11
Such legislation thus singling out the retarded for special
treatment reflects the real . and undeniable differences between the retarded and others. That a civilized and decent
society expects and approves such legislation indicates that
governmental consideration of those differences in the vast
majority of situations is not only legitimate but desirable. It
may be, as CLC contends, that legislation designed to benefit, rather than disadvantage, the retarded would generally
withstand examination under a test of heightened scrutiny.
See Brief for Respondents 38-41. The relevant inquiry,
however, is whether heightened scrutiny is constitutionally
mandated in the first instance. Even assuming that many of
these laws could be shown to be substantially related to an
important governmental purpose, merely requiring the legislature to justify its efforts in these terms may lead it to re11
CLC originally sought relief under the Act, but voluntarily dismissed
this pendent state claim when the District Court indicated that its presence
might make abstention appropriate. The Act had never been construed
by the Texas courts. App. 12, 14, 84-87.
A number of states have passed legislation prohibiting zoning that excludes the retarded. See, e. g., Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 1566 et seq.;
Conn. Gen Stat. § 8-3e; N. D. C. C. § 25-16-14(2); R. I. Gen. Laws. Tit.
45, ch. 24 § 22. See also Md. Ann. Code, Health-General Article, § 7-102.
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frain from acting at all. Much recent legislation intended to
benefit the retarded also assumes the need for measures that
r¢ght be perceived to disadvantage them. The Education of
the Handicapped Act, for example, requires an ·"appropriate"
education, not one that is equal in all respects to the education of non-retarded children; clearly, admission to a class
that exceeded the abilities of a retarded child would not be
appropriate. 12 Similarly, the Developmental Disabilities Act
and the Texas act give the retarded the right to live only in
the "least restrictive setting" appropriate to their abilities,
implicitly assuming the need for at least some restrictions
that would not be imposed on others. 13 Especially given the
wide variation in the abilities and needs of the retarded themselves, governmental bodies must have a certain amount of
flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and
limiting their remedial efforts.
Third, the legislative response, which could hardly have occurred and survived without public support, negates any
claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless in
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of
the lawmakers. Any minority can be said to be powerless to
assert direct control over the legislature, but if that were a
criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts, much economic and social legislation would now be suspect.
Fourth, if the large and amorphous class of the mentally
retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by
the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled
way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have per12
The Act, which specifically included the mentally retarded in its definition of handicapped, see 20 U. S. C. § 1401(1), also recognizes the great
variations within the classification of retarded children. The Act requires
that school authorities devise an "individualized eduational program," id.,
at § 1401(19), that is "tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped
child." Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 181 (1982).
18
The Developmental Disabilities Act also withholds public funds from
any program that does not prohibit the use of physical restraint "unless absolutely necessary." 42 U. S. C. § 6010(2).
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haps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who
cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses,
and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part
of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only
the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We
are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do
so.
Doubtless, there have been and there will continue to be
instances of discrimination against the retarded that are in
fact invidious, and that are properly subject to judicial correction under constitutional norms. But the appropriate
method of reaching such instances is not to create a new
quasi-suspect classification and subject all governmental action based on that classification to more searching evaluation.
Rather, we should look to the likelihood that governmental
action premised on a particular classification is valid as a general matter, not merely to the specifics of the case before us.
Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the government may legitimately take into account in a wide range
of decisions, and because both state and federal governments
have recently committed themselves to assisting the retarded, we will not presume that any given legislative action,
even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in
considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate.
Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect
class does not leave them entirely unprotected from !nvidious
discrimination. To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and
others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. This standard, we believe, affords government the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed
to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to
freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the retarded in what is essentially an incidental manner. The
State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an
asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction ar-
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bitrary or irrational. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55,
61-63; United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U. S. 528, 535 (1973). Furthermore, some objectivessuch as "a bare .. · . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group;" Moreno, 413 U. S., at 534--are not legitimate state
interests. See also Zobel, supra, 457 U. S., at 63. Beyond
that, the mentally retarded, like others, have and retain their
substantive constitutional rights in addition to the right to be
treated equally by the law.
IV
We turn to the issue of the validity of the zoning ordinance
insofar as it requires a special use permit for homes for the
mentally retarded. 14 We inquire first whether requiring a
special use permit for the Featherston home in the circumstances here deprives respondents of the equal protection of
the laws. If it does, there will be no occasion to decide
whether the special use permit provision is facially invalid
where the mentally retarded are involved, or to put it another way, whether the city may never insist on a special use
permit for a home for the mentally retarded in an R-3 zone.
This is the preferred course of adjudication since it enables
courts to avoid making unnecessarily broad constitutional
judgments. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,-- U. S. - - ,
(1985); United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171 (1983);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963).
The constitutional issue is clearly posed. The City does
not require a special use permit in an R-3 zone for apartment
houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories, apartment hotels,
hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or
the aged (other than for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug addicts), private clubs or fraternal orders, and
14
It goes without saying that there is nothing before us with respect to
the va]idity of requiring a special use permit for the other uses listed in the
ordinance. See n. 3, supra.
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other specified uses. It does, however, insist on a special
permit for the Featherston home, and it does so, as the District Court found, because it would be a facility for the mentally retarded.
May the city require the permit for this facility when other care and multiple dwelling facilities are
freely permitted?
It is true, as already pointed out, that the mentally retarded as a group are indeed different from others not sharing their misfortune, and in this respect they may be different from those who would occupy other facilities that would
be permitted in an R-3 zone without a special permit. But
this difference is largely irrelevant unless the Featherston
home and those who would oc;cupy it would threaten legitimate interests of the city in a way that other permitted uses
such as boarding houses and hospitals would not. Because in
our view the record does not reveal any rational basis for believing that the Featherston home would pose any special
threat to the city's legitimate interests, we affirm the judgment below insofar as it holds the ordinance invalid as applied
in this case.
The District Court found that the City Council's insistence
on the permit rested on several factors. First, the Council
was concerned with the negative attitude of the majority of
property owners located within 200 feet of the Featherston
facility, as well as with the fears of elderly residents of the
neighborhood. But mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, is not a permissible basis for treating a home
for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses,
multiple dwellings, and the like. It is plain that the electorate as a whole, whether by referendum or or otherwise, could
not order city action violative of the Equal Protection clause,
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377
U. S. 713, 736-737 (1964), and the City may not avoid the
strictures of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the body politic. "Private biases
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may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." Palmore v. Sidoti,
- u. s. - , - (1984).
Second, the Council had two objections to the location of
the facility. It was concerned that the facility was across the
street from a junior high school, and it feared that the students might harass the occupants of the Featherston home.
But the school itself is attended by about 30 mentally retarded students, and denying a permit based on such vague,
undifferentiated fears is again permitting some portion of the
community to validate what would otherwise be an equal protection violation. The other objection to the home's location
was that it was located on "a five hundred year flood plain."
This concern with the possibility of a flood, however, can
hardly be based on a distinction between the Featherston
home and, for example, nursing homes, homes for convalescents or the aged, or sanitariums or hospitals, any of which
could be located on the Featherston site without obtaining a
special use permit. The same may be said of another concern of the Council-doubts about the legal responsibility for
actions which the mentally retarded might take. If there is
no concern about legal responsibility with ·respect to other
uses that would be permitted in the area, such as boarding
and fraternity houses, it is difficult to believe that the groups
of mildly or moderately mentally retarded individuals who
would live at 201 Featherston would present any different or
special hazard.
Fourth, the Council was concerned with the size of the
home and the number of people that would occupy it. The
District Court found, and the Court of Appeals repeated,
that "if the potential residents of the Featherston Street
home were not mentally retarded, but the home was the
same in all other respects, its use would be permitted under
the city's zoning ordinance." App. 93; 726 F. 2d, at 200.
Given this finding, there would be rio restrictions on the number of people who could occupy this home as a boarding
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house, nursing home, family dwelling, fraternity house, or
dormitory. The question is whether it is rational to treat the
mentally retarded differently. It is true that they suffer disability not shared by others; but why this difference warrants
a density regulation that others need not observe is not .at all
apparent. At least this record does not clarify how, in this
connection, the characteristics of the intended occupants of
the Featherston home rationally justify denying to those occupants what would be permitted to groups occupying the
same site for different purposes. Those who would live in
the Featherston home are the type of individuals who, with
supporting staff, satisfy federal and state standards for group
housing in the community; and there is no dispute that the
home would meet the federal square-footage-per-resident requirement for facilities of this type. See 42 CFR § 442, 447
(1984). In the words of the Court of Appeals, "The City
never justifies its apparent view that other people can live
under such 'crowded' conditions when mentally retarded persons cannot." 726 F. 2d, at 202.
In the courts below the city also urged that the ordinance is
aimed at avoiding concentration of population and at lessening congestion of the streets. These concerns obviously fail
to explain why apartment houses, fraternity and sorority
houses, hospitals and the like, may freely locate in the area
without a permit. So, too, the expressed worry about fire
hazards, the serenity of the neighborhood, and the avoidance
of danger to other residents fail rationally to justify singling
out a home such as 201 Featherston for the special use permit, yet imposing no such restrictions on the many other uses
freely permitted in the neighborhood.
The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded, including those who would occupy the
Featherston facility and who would live under the closely supervised and highly regulated conditions expressly provided
for by state and federal law.
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar as
it invalidates the zoning ordinance as applied to the
Featherston home. The judgment is otherwise vacated.

It is so ordered.
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on the question, as for example between you and me. Since under
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case should not live together without supervision, and since the
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group living situations, it seems to me that the City could
insist on a special permit to make sure that proper supervision
was planned for.
If it was proposed that a group of retarded
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Petitioners have filed - a' motion for
leave to file a
supplemental brief and a supplemental brief.
I have asked Al
Stevas to add it to this week's list, and it should be discussed.
The brief points to the recent enactment of a Texas statute that
effectively prohibits the exclusion from residential zoning
districts of group homes that serve six or fewer mentally
retarded residents.
Respondents have filed a response opposing
the motion, which Al Stevas will circulate today.
Although I
would grant the motion, I see nothing in the brief that affects
the result or the opinion in this case.
Petitioners argue that
after the statute takes effect on September 1, 1985, CLC will be
able to house no more than six residents at 201 Featherston.
Supplemental Brief at 3~
But the statute, which is attached to
the brief as an appendix, does not address what local authorities
may do with regard to group homes that serve more than six
residents.
Presumably, the situation with regard to such homes
will be no different after the statute is enacted:
as far as
state law is concerned, the City may require or not require
permits for such homes, as it sees fit.
Assuming that the Court grants petitioners' motion for leave
to file this brief, I intend to add the following paragraph to
the end of footnote 7, on page 5 of the currently circulating
draft:
After oral argument, the City brought to our attention
the recent enactment of a Texas statute, effective
September 1, 1985,
providing that "family homes" are
permitted uses in "all residential zones or districts
in this state." The statute defines a "family home" as
a community-based residence housing no more than six
disabled persons,
including the mentally retarded,
along with two supervisory personnel. The statute does
not appear to affect the City's actions with regard to
group homes that plan to house more than six residents.
The enactment of this legislation therefore does not
affect our disposition of this case.
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f.eems to me this footnote may well be read as suggestinrj yet
another level or "test" of "especially vigilant" scrutiny at
least for illegitimacy.
I can join your earlier draft which did not tie me so
pointedly to your Matthews dissent, but your second draft
unhinges mel

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 26, 1985

84-468 - City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center

Dear Thurgood,
I

shall

recirculate

in

this

case

by

adding to footnote 7 the few lines mentioned
in my Memorandum
19,

which

But

I

to

referred

shall

at

the Conference of- June
to a

this

new Texas

late

date

forego

response to your dissenting opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 27, 1985

,

# ••

Re: No. 84-468, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
Dear Thurgood:
Please JOln me in your opinion concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference
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City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (Annrnarie)
BRW for the Court 4/26/85
1st draft 5/29/85
2nd draft 6/4/85
3rd draft 6/11/85
4th draft 6/17/85
Jbined by WHR 6/3/85
soc 6/4/85
WHR 6/12/85
LFP 6/17/85
JPS 6/19/85
JPS concurring
1st draft 6/19/85
2nd draft 6/21/85
3rd draft 6j26j85
Jbined by CJ 6/20/85
TM concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting

part
Typed draft 6/24/85
1st printed draft 6/25/85
Joined by HAB 6/27/85
WJB 6/27/85
WJB awaiting dissent 6/3/85
TM will dissent 6/5/85
Letter to BRW - 6/5/85
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